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INTRODUCTION 
INTRODUCTION 
For years producers of trade marked, labeled, and iden-
tifiable merchandise have sought ways in which to control the 
price at which their product is resold to the consumer by the 
retailer. Many and devious were the devices used to accom-
plish this end. Large manufacturers who had sufficient re-
sources were able to maintain the resale price of their goods 
by means of agency selling, under ·w·hich they retained the title 
to the goods and hence incurred no legal objection by stipu-
lating the price at which they desired the merchant to sell 
their produe·t. ~maller manufacturers, or those to whom agency 
selling was not suitable, often tried to dictate the resale 
price of their goods, but inevitably ran afoul of legal com-
plications. 
Vistributors, too, have had an interest in this matter. 
Large scale dealers, such as the chains and department stores, 
often used a merchandising scheme known as ffloss leaderrt sell-
ing. This involved offering at attractive prices the standard, 
identifiable products which had become well kno'vn to the con-
sumer and which he would immediately recognize as a bargain. 
As an advertising stunt this practice drew trade to Which the 
merchant often sold other merchandise on which his mark up was 
greater than on the trade marked goods. Sometimes the dealer 
tried to substitute private brand goods for the leader items. 
Obvious~y by selling these products at prices below the cost 
of operation, the dealers had to recoup these losses by charg-
ing a higher margin on goods not easily subject to price com-
parison, or they had to rely on greatly increased volume as a 
result of their loss leader advertising. Chains and depart-
ment stores, by virtue of their diversified lines, were able 
to make effective use of this type of selling. Small dealers 
naturally were unable to employ this means of advertising, and 
their objection to the practice became increasingly more force-
ful. 
The real difficulty to the operation of resale price main-
tenance schemes, however, was legal rather than economic. Our 
economy has theoretically been patterned after the laissez-
faire doctrine which came of age with its exposition by Ad~ 
Smith in 1776. Under such a system, production and distribu-
tion were supposedly free from private or government control 
and the system was proclaimed to be automatic. In the absence 
of other control, production and distribution were theoretical-
ly regulated by competition. Price and profit determined the 
flow of capital; and these in turn were determined by the pre-
sence of competition. 
In the latter part of the 19th century, however, and still 
later in the early 20th century, it was discovered that compe-
tition had apparently failed in certain enterprises, particu-
larly the utilities, and hence legislation was enacted to pre-
vent the development of monopoly and to preserve the regula-
tive effectiveness of competition. Under the Sherman Anti-
Trust Act and the Clayton Act certain specific practices and 
any practice in general which served to restrain trade were 
held to be illegal. 
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Resale price maintenance itself was not specifically de-
clared to be unlawful, but court interpretation and later in-
terpretations by the Federal Trade Commission of its own Act 
which prohibited unfair methods of competition, soon made any 
attempt to control the resale price of a commodity definitely 
illegal. Although numerous Commission cease and desist orders 
were issued to restrain this practice, and numerous court de-
cisions upheld these orders, the problem did not really become 
acute during the prosperity years of the twenties. Like many 
other economic controversies, however, that of resale price 
maintenance made itself increasingly more prominent in the de-
pression years. In the era of the National Recovery Adminis-
tration the issue temporarily lost its force, but with the in-
validation of the codes drafted under this legislation the of-
fensive was once again launched for the legislative recognition 
of resale price maintenance. 
Arter several years of energetic struggle the proponents 
of such legislation t'inally enjoyed a triumphant victory. All 
but five of the states passed laws which specifically recog-
nized the private contractual right of manut'acturers to enter 
into agreements with their dealers for the purpose or stipula-
ting the resale price ot' their merchandise. Nor was this all, 
for in 1937 the Federal Government passed a so-called Enabling 
Act which freed agreements as to the resale price ot' commodities 
from prosecution under the Federal Anti-Trust Acts it' the con-
tracts were made in states where such agreements were not ille-
gal. This legislation paraded under the proud banner of "Fair 
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Trade Laws". 
With the almost universal legalization of resale price 
maintenance, the issue has become of vital social and econo-
mic significance. Vfhile the fight for "Fair Trade" was pro-
gressing, much propaganda was produced on both sides of the 
controversy. It has seemed desirable, therefore, to attempt 
to sift these arguments and to present some sort of objective 
picture of the true nature of resale price maintenance. The 
absence of reliable statistical data has made the formulation 
of unqualified conclusions impossible. But enough information 
is available to permit a valuable analysis. 
As an approach to the study, some of the economic aspects 
of resale price maintenance have been presented without refer-
ence to the legal problems. The practice itself is first de-
fined, and then consideration is given to its relation to 
price cutting, a situation largely responsible for the agita-
tion for the adoption of resale price maintenance. The ques-
tion has been discussed with reference to manufacturers, dis-
tributors, and consumers. Particular attention has been given 
to such problems as good will and property rights, production, 
loss leaders, sales below cost, determination of margins, com-
petition, and monopoly. The effort has been made to present 
both sides of a controversial, theoretical question, to point 
out some of the more difficult problems involved, and to sup-
plement the presentation with statistics whenever possible. 
Attention is next directed to some of the earlier legal 
aspects of resale price maintenance, mainly to acquaint the 
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student with the necessary background for understanding the 
later laws on this subject. The Fair Trade Laws themselves 
have been clearly stated and defined, together with an an-
alysis of the nature of these laws, the forces which have 
favored and opposed them, and to a limited extent the court 
history of this legislation. 
Finally, the effort has been made to appraise the in-
fluence of these laws on competition. Such problems as the 
extent of their use, the type of products involved in resale 
price maintenance contracts, brand competition, producer com-
petition, and prices have been discussed. 
Again it is necessary to emphasize that the object of the 
study is not to support either side of the issue, nor to draw 
definite conclusions on the economic advantages or disadvan-
tages of Fair Trade Laws. Indeed, such an effort would be 
profitless in view of the sadly inadequate statistical data 
available. Rather, the intention has been to present an ob-
jective analysis of resale price maintenance, with particular 
reference to its operation under the Fair Trade Laws, It is 
hoped that such a study will lay a foundation for an impartial 
appraisal of the economic and social significance of resale 
price maintenance legislation when further experience with this 
type of price control reveals some reliable data upon which 
sound conclusions may be based. 
CHAPI'ER I 
THE ECONOMICS OF RESALE PRICE :MAINTENANCE 
I THE ECONOMICS .Q! RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 
"The position or the independent producer who establishes 
the price at which his own trade-marked article shall be 
sold to the consumer must not be contused with that or a 
combination or trust, which~ controlling the market, fix-
es the price or a staple article. The independent pro-
ducer is engaged in a business open to competition. The 
consumer who pays the price ••• does so voluntarily. But 
when a trust fixes, through its monopoly power, the price 
of a staple article in commin use, the consumer does not 
pay the price voluntarily." 
A. Definition of Hesale Price Maintenance 
In the above words Justice Brandeis summed up the essential 
nature of resale price maintenance in the years immediately fol-
lowing the historic Supreme Court decision rendered in the 
case of the Dr. Miles Medical Company v. John D. Park and Sons 
2 
Company and long before the Federal Trade Commission, the 
Codes of the ill-fated N.R.A., and the recent wave of Fair 
Trade Laws cast their influence on this practice. Briefly, re-
sale price maintenance refers to the attempt of manufacturers 
to control the price at Which their products are resold to the 
public by retailers or indirectly by wholesaler-retailer dis-
tribution. Actually it is narrower than this, for it is limi-
ted to trade-marked, identifiable goods, Which by astute sales 
and advertising campaigns on the part of the maker have become 
associated in the minds of the consumer as goods of definite 
quality standards. 
It is to be distinguished from price fixing, with which 
unfortunately it often is conrused. The practice is not the 
1 
2Louis D. Brandeis, Business--A Profession, p. 256, (1933) 220 u.s. 373, (1911). -
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result of a monopolistic combination which seeks to control 
the market of a product, nor is it an attempt on the part of 
the State to establish the price of goods by law. It is nei-
ther of these; but rather the practice by which an individual 
producer who has developed a well-known, identifiable product 
tries to maintain the price of his merchandise in its resale 
to the consumer. The effort is made to link price and name, 
and thus to free the product from aggressive price competition. 
Any attempt to analyze and evaluate this practice divides 
itself into two parts, Which, though they are interrelated, 
are yet vrorthy of separate treatment. First there is the ec-
onomic phase of resale price maintenance, and second, the le-
gal phase. Before attempting a presentation of the legality 
of this trade practice, it is first desirable to develop its 
economic influence on manufacturers, distributors, and consu-
mers. Further discussion of the economic significance of re-
sale price maintenance under its present legal status will be 
deferred until a later chapter. Here the purpose is to present 
the reasons for its adoption, the arguments rendered in favor 
of it, and those opposed to it, together with a consideration 
of some of the problems encountered in its operation. 
B. Resale Price Maintenance Versus Price Cutting 
Probably the chief factor which contributed to the adoption 
of resale price maintenance by manufacturers both prior to its 
present legalization by statutory law and since the enactment 
of Fair Trade legislation was the widespread use of price cut-
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ting by retail outlets. This was the reason for its attempted 
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use by the Miles Medical Co. , ; it vre.s the reason for continued 
efforts to control resale prices during the period when the 
Federal Trade Commission tried to outlaw resale price mainte-
nance; and this was the reason for the recent legislative tri-
umph of those Who favored controlling the prices at which goods 
were resold. Strong arguments have been advanced to show that 
price cutting is really in the public interest and has sound 
economic justification; equally strong arguments have been 
raised against the practice. 
It should be remembered that in discussing price cutting 
and its attempted remedy through resale price maintenance, that 
the problem is centered about the trade-marked, identified pro-
duct which has received consumer recognition. With this in 
mind it will be well .to consider more specifically how price 
cutting affects manufacturers, distributors, and consumers, and 
h01lv its antidote, resale price maintenance, meets the situation. 
1. 1B Relation 1£ Manufacturers -- Under conditions of a 
household economy, where the artisan makes and sells his own 
goods, it is evident that he alone has undisputed right to 
sell that article at whatever price he chooses, limited, of 
course, by the demand side of the market. The goods are 
clearly his, to do with as he pleases. His concern is to de-
velop a quality product, and to be known for his uniformity 
of reliable merchandise. 
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But under modern conditions of production and distribu-
tion an entirely different situation arises. This changed 
condition is essentially the result of the indirect means of 
distribution. The situation is still fu~her complicated when 
the manufacturer sells through middlemen, while simultaneously 
maintaining direct contact with the public through national 
advertising, and where because of the identifiable nature of 
the product, the consumer holds the producer responsible for 
quality and uniformity. Under such a system, the question a-
r.ises as to what rights, if any, a manufacturer retains in his 
product while it is in the hands of middlemen. Herein lies the 
real legal and economic problem of resale price maintenance. 
a. uoodwill ~ Property Rignts--The usual contention rel-
ative to a manufacturer's interest in his goods after they had 
passed into the hands of the middleman has been that he no 
longer had any control over his product. With the passage of 
the title went also his rights in the merchandise. Such a 
view has been held by those who have attempted to defend their 
right to sell any of their stock at whatever price they chose 
despite the efforts of the manufacturer to dictate the resale 
price. Notable among these have been the chains and large de-
4 partment stores. 
The other view in respect to the property rights of the 
manufacturer in his goods is represented by Justice Brandeis 
in whose opinion the marketing of goods is essentially a trans-
4~ . J!ederal Trade Co:mmission, Report on Resale Price Mainte-
nance, Part 11, pp. 83, 152, (193IT. 
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action between the maker and the user, and that all others in-
volved in the process are only agents~ 
It was stated earlier that price cutting was chiefly re-
sponsible for the adoption of resale price maintenance agree-
ments. One of the most conspicuous types of price cutting and 
one that has been vigorously denounced by many manufacturers 
and by retailers not desiring to participate, has been the use 
of the device known as the loss leader. Here a merchant uses 
a trade-marked, labelled product which has developed consumer 
recognition for quality and uniformity, and whose price has 
been relatively stable, and, to attract customers offers such 
an article at a noticeably reduced price. These prices are 
usually below the actual costs of handling the product. With 
the brand or trade mark as a guarantee of quality, the consu-
mer immediately recognizes a bargain, and is led to purchase 
the product so advertised. 
Loss leaders are essentially an advertising device. Ei-
ther they are used to attract customers who will in all prob-
ability buy other merchandise as well as the advertised bar-
gain, or they are used ¥nth the intention of substituting, if 
possible, some other product in place of the loss leader and 
on Which a larger mark-up is received~ Before considering the 
use of price cutting in relation to retailing, it is first nec-
essary to analyze the affect of this practice on the manufac-
turer. 
5 ~- ~·· p. 251 
6 
Albert Haring, Retail Price Cutting, p.4, (1935) 
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While it would be naive to accept the position that the 
recent Fair Trade Legislation was the result of the sincere 
efforts of manufacturers who desired to protect their good-
will from unscrupulous price-cutters, nevertheless, that at 
least was one of the reasons, and gmong manufacturers who 
supported such legislation the chief argument advanced was 
that their goodwill and reputation was being destroyed by 
the loss leader method of selling. How this is accomplished 
is explained by Justice Brandeis as follows: 
ffTo sell a Dollar Ingersoll watch for sixty-seven 
cents injures both the manufacturer and the reg-
ular dealer; because it tends to make the public 
believe that either the manufacturer's or the 
dealer's profits are ordinarily exhorbitant; or, 
in other words, that the watch is not worth a 
dollar ••• n7 
This view is held by many manufacturers, as for example 
by a certain hardware manufacturer in California who expresses 
the opinion that price cutting, which is usually done on well-
knovm merchandise, in order to draw trade, actually tears 
down public confidence in merchandise which manufacturers, with 
the co-operation of legitimate retailers, spent good money and 
8 years of effort to build up. 
The Federal Trade Commission, while consistently opposed 
to resale price maintenance, and an objector to the enactment 
of Fair Trade Laws, in its report on resale price maintenance 
speaks as follows on the matter of goodwill: 
7
..Qp. ill·' p. 253 
8 E.L. Harter, Central Hardware Co., Hollywood, Cal., Hardware 
Retailer, Jan., 1958. 
.. 
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ffThat the manufacturer of trade-marked goods who uses 
the customary wholesaler to retailer channels of dis-
tribution has a real economic interest in the goodwill 
attaching to his branded products that extends beyond 
the point Where he ceases to own them cannot be ques-
tioned, Neither can it be doubted that distributors 
who ovm such goods as intermediaries between the man-
ufacturer and the consumer can, and frequently do, use 
the manufacturer's branded articles as price-cut lead-
ers in ways that tend to injure the manufacturer's 
distribution .by discouraging other distributors in han-
dling them. '19 
This question of property rights in trade-marked or iden-
tifiable goods was acutely analyzed by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in its decision in the case of The Old Dear-
born Distributing Co. v. Seagram Distiller's Corp. when the 
Illinois Fair Trade Law was attacked on grounds of constitu-
tionality. The court made a distinction between the right of 
the retailer in the commodity bought for resale and his right 
in the gpod will of the manufacturer as represented by the 
trade mark on the merchandise. While the distributor could 
sell the commodity as such at whatever price he chose, when-
ever he sold it together with the trade mark or identification 
of the manufacturer he must adhere to the price fixed by the 
producer in the contract. Goodwill was recognized as a prop- . 
erty right capable of protection. 10 
There are other kinds of injury that may result to the 
manufacturer because of the predatory price cutting to which 
his product may have been subjected, but this matter of gpod 
9F.T.C., QE_. Cit., p. 10 
1~e New York Times, Dec. 8, 1936. {~uoting full text of 
Supreme court Decision.) 
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will has been one of the reasons loudly advanced by manufac-
turer-proponents of laws to legalize resale price maintenance, 
and on this issue the constitutionality of the Fair Trade laws 
was upheld. Vfuether the manufacturer is injured depends on 
whether his sales decline because of loss of consumer confi-
dence in his product and in his integrity. Statistics are not 
available which would give information of the extent to which 
such injury has actually resulted. 
To guard against loss of reputation and a possibly cur-
tailed market caused by price wars on their merchandise, many 
manufacturers resorted to the practice of attempting to control 
the prices at Which dealers resold their gpods. The legal his-
tory of these attempts forms a separate part of this study. 
The economic justification for the use of this device rests in 
fact that it was merely a protection of a real interest and 
value which the manufacturer had created by an expenditure of 
huge sums in advertising and which was being destroyed by cer-
tain dealer outlets by their widespread use of loss-leaders. 
Possibly further economic justification for resale price main-
tenance is revealed in the following sub-section. 
b. In relation 1£ production and distribution--The manu-
facturer's concern with price maintenance and price cutting 
extends also to the repercussions on his output. It is in an-
ticipation of demand that a manufacturer invests in equipment, 
advertises his product, and builds up goodwill and reputation. 
His plans are upset when retailers, in order to attract cus-
tomers to whom they can sell other goods, or on whom they pass 
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out a substituted article which nets them a higher margin, (a 
subject that will be discus sed in detail later) use his mer-
chandise as a loss leader. While sales may at first be stim-
ulated because of the lowered prices of some, substitution 
eventually lessens sales volume, and non-cut stores find that 
price comparisons favor competitors and hence they either stop 
featuring it or discontinue it entirely. All this may occur 
in the face of earnest efforts by the manufacturer to stop 
price cutting • 
.f!'urthernore, substitution tends to be economically waste-
ful. Lowest costs are usually possible when manufacturers 
supply a competitive market through capacity production. Sub-
stitution, with its accompanying demand for unbranded or lit-
tle-knovm articles (some of which are inferior), brings new 
producers into the field. Then both the new and old producers 
operate at less than capacity, and in the long run idle capacity 
means greater costs. Retailers also attempt to carry more brands 
than necessary of some products which increases inventory costs. 
11 
Both these results are economically wasteful. 
'l'hat such curtailment of sales volume has occurred is ev-
idenced by the report in ~ishers' WeeklX which stated that 
in the 1935 book price war among New York department stores the 
small book sellers felt the immediate effect, and with sales 
llHaring, QE.. ill.·, pp. 7-10; also, William Ingersoll, 
"Mr. Roosevelt and Prices", Printers' l!!!s, )t. '66, May 
27, 19.37. 
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12 
falliDg off, cancelled orders from publishers. 
It is seen, then, that because of the peculiar nature 
of branded merchandise, which makes it useable as a loss l eader 
that manufacturers may be adversely affeeted. It was even sug-
gested that social loss might result through the waste engen-
dered by predatory price cutting. Sueh arguments as these 
were offered in defease of the policy of resale price mainte-
nance both prior to the present decade, and in support of the 
recent resale price maintenance legislation. 
Opponents of resale price maintenance argue that whatever 
loss is incurred through predatory price cutting is negligible 
compared to the losses that would result if price maintenance 
were legalized and producers were allowed to set whatever price 
they desired for their goods. Under such conditions, it was 
felt that manufacturers would unduly enhance prices, and the 
public would be the loser through haTing to pay higher prices 
and through the perpetuation of inefficient dealers. 
In answer to such charges, and also indicative of the prob-
lems besetting the producer who wishes to aTail himself of price 
maintenance, the Federal Trade Commission's report on Resale 
Price Maintenance suggests that the public would be protected · 
from unscrupulous manufacturers by the existence of competition 
of other producers. In other words a manufacturer would hesi-
tate before succumbing to the temptation of setting an exorbi-
12
oct. 19 1935 
' . 
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tant resale price for his goods not o~ly through fear of a cur-
tailed demand, but from fear of the potential competition from 
producers of like products. In its report the Commission says 
that both proponents and opponents of resale price maintenamce 
legislation "uniformily agreed that if the resale price main-
taining manufacturer placed his price level relatively high in 
an attempt to cover his national advertising or to purchase 
dealer support, or to assure himself of what he regards as a 
legitimate profit, he will, if his product is really competitive;3 
invite the price competition of other manufacturers whose goods 
may be sold under the maker's brands or under the priTate brands 
of wholesalers or retailers". 14 
Dealer margins represent another of the producers' problems 
when attempting resale price maintenance. If, for example, to 
meet price competition he reduces dealer margins, he may then 
lose dealer support. The chances of engendering loss of dealer 
goodwill are always present. Therefore, some manufacturers who 
favored the enactment of resale price maintenance laws in the 
Commission's questionaire, indicated they would not consider re-
sale price maintenance desirable for their own products. 15 
Arguments then are available to show that under price com-
petition there is economic waste; arguments are ~~so available 
13aesale Price Maintenance laws have been confined to pro-
ducts which are in open competition with other products 
of the same or similar nature. Further details will be 
discussed in the chapter on Fair Trade Laws. 
14Q£. Cit., p. 137 
15 Ibid., p. 138 
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to show that under conditions of resale price maintenance waste 
is present. In the absence of statistical data, the problem 
will have to remain in the realm of theory. That the question 
is involved is apparent, and will become more so when consid-
eration is given to the problems of the middleman in reference 
to price cutting and resale price maintenance. 
2. _In_ Relation to ~D~i~s~t~r~ib~u~t~or~s~-- vVhile ostensibly it is 
the manufacturer who has desired to employ resale price main-
tenance in order to protect his goodwill, the recent agitation 
for legalization of this practice has stemmed to a great ex-
tent from associations of independent retailers. This phase 
of price maintenance will be given consideration in the chap-
ter dealing with the Fair Trade Laws, but its mention here is 
necessary to a complete understanding of the problems of re-
tail distribution which have their origin in the practice of 
price cutting and in the effort to eliminate that type of mer-
chandising through resale price maintenance. To a large degree 
the arguments relative to the wisdom of legalized price mainte-
nance concern their effects on distribution. For that reason 
it will be well before considering the price laws themselves to 
devote some attention to the economic aspects of price cutting 
and price maintenance on retail distribution. 
a. Purpose ~ ~ of ~ Leaders-- The purpose of loss 
leaders has been defined above as that of advertising. The 
term has usually referred to the practice of selling "leader" 
items, that is, items whose reputation and demand were well es-
tablished in the public mind as a result of intensive advertis-
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ing and selling on the part of the maker of the product. Such 
products are usually trade-marked or otherwise labelled or 
branded so that identification is easily possible. The re-
tailer offers these articles at prices which when compared to 
their usual selling price appear to the consumer as a true bar-
gain. The charge that such items were sold below cost gave 
sanction to the use of the term "loss leader". vVhether such 
merchandise was actually sold below cost will presently be 
considered. 
Whether or not sales below cost were made, the reduced 
price of leaders was designed to attract customers. The ob-
vious advantage of using well-known products for this purpose 
is apparent. Advertised sales of goods unknovm to the public 
would not stimulate great interest since the natural reaction 
of the consllm.er is to doubt the quality of the product. But 
when practiced on branded goods of recognized reputation, this 
fear is dispelled, and sales of the product are often greatly 
stimulated. 
However, the merchant's object is B21 12 sell leader mer-
chandise. Especially is this not his intention if he actually 
is selling below cost. The true purpose is at least two-fold: 
1. to attract trade to the store, and then to sell other goods 
on which profitable margins are possible; 2. to create the im-
pression that all articles in the store are sold at lower prices 
as a result of efficient and competent management. Justice 
Brandeis characterizes the practice as follows: 
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"The dealer who sells the Dollar Ingersoll watch 
ror sixty-seven cents necessarily loses money in that 
particular transaction. He has no desire to sell any 
article on which he must lose money. He advertises 
the sale partly to attract customers to his store; but 
mainly to create in the minds of those customers the 
false impression that other articles in which he deals 
and which are not of a standard or known value will be 
sold upon like favorable terms •••• The more successful 
the individual producer of a trade-marked article has 
been in creating for it a recognized value as well as 
a wide sale, the greater is t~g temptation to the un-
scrupulous to cut the price." 
In other words, loss leaders are used as bait. Obvi-
ously all articles cannot be sold at unprofitable margins. 
The merchant's stock must be so prieed that total sales 
yield an average mark-up that is satisfactory. Realizing 
this, it seems evident that losses must be recouped on the 
unknown items. The Federal Trade Commission, though hos-
tile to resale price maintenance reports as follows: 
"Those favoring resale price maintenance claim that 
chains sell nationally advertised products at low 
prices, even at a loss, as leaders, and more than 
offset this by making large profits on competing ar-
ticles. The data indicate that on the average the 
chains did make high margins on competing articles 
that tended to offset the lower average margins on 
nationally advertised goods. T~~ same however, was 
true of independent merchants." 
Statistical evidence that merchants using loss lea-
ders make up for the loss thus sustained by the sale of 
competing but unidentifiable merchandise on which they 
receive margins sufficiently high so that their total 
yield is profitable is furnished by the Federal Trade Com-
16Brandeis, Q£. Cit., pp. 252, 253. 
1? Op. Cit., p. 103. 
- --
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mission which reveals that non-branded goods were sold by 
independent drug stores at an average margin of 46.5% con-
trasted with an average margin of 28.7% on nationally ad-
vertised goods. Department stores showed a similar sit-
uation, with an average margin of 36.6% on the less well 
known products and an average margin of only 25.9% on the 
18 
branded items. Thus both druggists and department stores 
were able to recoup losses from price cutting on nation-
ally advertised merchandise by the sale of the rest of their 
stock at prices yielding substantially higher margins. 
Those approving the use of price cutting on identifiable 
products claim that it is no more unfair than any other form 
of advertising. Price merely becomes the advertising medium. 
Two rather cogent arguments of those who disapprove of the 
practice consist of the following reasoning: first, the 
practice is really deceptive, since it tends to create the 
erroneous impression that all merchandise is sold at equally 
low prices, and hence this device enables merchants to take 
unfair advantage of the consumer; second, the practice ac-
tually amounts to stealing, since it is not price alone that 
is used as the advertising medium, but price and name, and 
without the appeal of the reputation of the recognized pro-
duct which was established through expensive advertising on 
the part of the manufacturer, the price appeal would be mean-
ingless. It really results in using someone else's advertis-
18 ££. £!1., p. 106. 
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ing to the advantage of the merchant. 
Before attempting any conclusions in the matter, it 
will be well to consider the nature of so-called below 
cost sales. 
b. Sales Below £2!1-- Chief among the arguments that 
certain merchants are selling nationally-advertised goods 
as loss leaders is the claim that these retailers sell 
such merchandise at prices below cost. Often such claims 
are made without definition of what is meant by the term 
below~· Usually it is not restricted to the practice 
of selling products below their actual invoice cost to the 
store keeper, but rather refers to the sale of such items 
at a price which while it may be above the invoice cost 
is nevertheless below the necessary price to produce a 
profit on the goods so sold. In other words, the mark-ups 
are contended to be insufficient to cover the costs of op-
eration. Difficulty here lies in the determination of what 
constitutes the costs of operation of a given retailer. 
The Federal Trade Commission attacks the problem prag-
matically hy comparing the prices of articles used as loss 
leaders to the average operating expenses of various types 
of outlets. For example, out of 43 items of nationally-ad-
vertised goods it was found that 26 of these items were sold 
at prices insufficient to cover average operating expenses 
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for four chains for the year 192?. Furthermore, independent 
druggists who reported an average operating expense of 2?.3% 
on sales sold 11 of 43 nationally-advertised products at 
prices which failed to yield a profit above the reported av-
19 
erage expenses. 
Two difficulties are apparent in such statistical man-
euvering. First, there is the question of what is meant by 
average operating expenses. An arithmetic average such as 
used here may not be a truly representative figure; and if 
not, then any conclusions based on such evidence lose much 
of their validity. Also, even if it is a fairly typical 
average, it is not clear that all the items supposedly sold 
below cost were handled by those whose margins corresponded 
to the hypothetical average. Finally, the sampling on which 
computations were made may not have been sound, for in the 
case of the average for chains t~e Commission used reports 
of only four chain. organizations. Evidently such statistics 
must be used with caution. 
Second, while the average may have been typical, it does 
not follow that operating costs for each item are the same. 
In the absence of accurate cost-accounting data, to say that 
any item is sold below cost, even though it be below the av-
erage operating cost of the particular business involved, may 
be grossly misleading. Costs of selling a given article may 
be above or below the average costs of operation. 
l9F.T.C., ~ £!!., pp, 102, 103. 
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Department and Chain stores have usually been the chief 
perpetrators of price cutting. The fact that independent 
druggists also engaged in loss leader selling is attributed 
to their attempt to meet the competition of these other out-
lets. Evidence that department stores are more guilty of 
this practice than independents is found in the Commission's 
report which states that while the average operating expenses 
of department stores was slightly higher than those reported 
by independent druggists (27.6% to 27.3%) the average margin 
realized by department stores on one sales unit of each of 
the nationally-advertised articles, 25.9%, was nearly three 
points in percentage less than the 28.7% realized by drug-
gists. On non-identifiable goods the difference was even 
20 
greater. 
Further comparison of department and independent drug 
stores which lends evidence on the matter of the relative 
degree of price cutting as practiced by these two types of 
outlet is furnished by the Federal Trade Commission in its 
report to the effect that it concludes that department stores 
were actually selling nationally-advertised goods at a loss. 
It bases this conclusion on a comparison of the selling price 
with a hypothetical cost of operation for drug departments. 
It admits that no data was available on costs of operating 
individual departments within a department store, but on the 
20Ibid., p. 107 
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basis of a survey of fifty stores whose average operating 
expenses were 2?.6%, it assumes an operating expense of 
2?% for the drug department. It then examined thirty-three 
nationally-advertised drug and toilet items, and of these 
discovered that seventeen were sold by department stores at 
prices yielding less than the 27% assumed necessary to cover 
costs. It emphasizes that the most widely advertised items 
were sold on the lowest margins. Six were sold even below 
20%. 
By contrast, 319 reporting drug stores revealed that 
the average operating expenses for that type of outlet was 
about 27.3%; however, the average margin made by the drug-
gists on sales of nationally-advertised goods was 28.?%. 
Only 9 of the same 33 items considered when studying the de-
partment stores were sold below 27.3%. None were sold below 
21 
2~. 
From this evidence the Commission concludes that chains 
and department stores have forced the independent drug stores 
to sell their nationally-advertised goods at little or no 
profit. It reports, however, that in no case was any article 
sold below purchase price. 
It is only natural that if such a picture of loss leader 
selling is accurate that independent outlets have been voci-
ferously opposed to the use of this device. They claim that 
it is not economically beneficial, since the stores using 
21Ibid., pp. 104-106 
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this type of selling must necessarily make a profit on total 
sales, and therefore what the consumer gains on purchases of 
leader items is lost when other articles are bought at prices 
necessari~y high enough to make up for the loss sustained on 
sales of the nationally-advertised merchandise. It is point-
ed out by proponents of resale price maintenance that de-
partment stores, for example, by the nature of their organ-
ization are able to engage in this type of selling since 
whatever losses are met in one department can be re-couped 
in some other department. By contrast, the individual shop 
dealing in only a limited line of goods has no such alterna-
tive. Therefore, the use of price cutting of this type 
tends to force the independents out of existence, results 
in curtailed distribution, and hence leads to monopoly and 
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ultimately to higher prices to the consumer. 
While the Federal Trade Commission's Report may properly 
be discounted to some extent both as to its statistical ac-
curacy and beQause · it is now perhaps out-dated, it is note-
worthy that severe price cutting occurred in the years 1933-
1935, before the wave of Fair Trade legislation, and that 
this price cutting has been largely confined to such commo-
dities as drugs, cosmetics, liquors, and books. This aspect 
will be considered when studying the Fair Trade Laws, but is 
significant, and lends some weight at least to the claims of 
22
•Publishers' Weekly (Editorial}, p. 805, Sept. 4, 1937. 
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the independents. 
(1) Turnover ~~Leaders-- It was suggested 
earlier that to say that a merchant was selling an item be-
low cost merely because his margin failed to yield him suf-
ficient income to meet the average operating expenses of his 
type of business may be misleading. Accurate cost accounting 
might reveal that the costs of selling certain items was 
less than the average costs of operating the business. Es-
pecially might this be true of the nationally-advertised mer-
chandise since it is generally admitted that the consumer 
demand for such goods renders them easier to sell and hence 
requires less sales effort and expense. But considered from 
another angle, it becomes even more evident that apparent 
sales below cost may in reality not be under the actual costs 
of that item. 
Hetailing is subject to a considerable extent to fixed 
costs. If this be true, then the volume of sales may vary 
up or d~Tn as much as one-third without a great change in 
current expenses or even in inventory. Hence increased 
volume means that operating expenses have been relatively re-
23 
duced. In other words, costs do not necessarily increase 
proportionately with volume. 
Suppose, for example, that a druggist buys an article at 
6? cents and sells it at $1.00 to get the usual gross profit. 
23 Haring, Q£. £!!., p. 5. 
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If he sells 10 articles, his gross profit is $3.30. But 
if he cuts the price to 87 cents and sales double, the 20 
articles yield a gross profit of $4.40. The druggist is 
therefore better off to the extent of $1.10. Although 
cost accounting may show his costs of operation to be 27~ 
and that an 87 cent sale is below cost, yet because of his 
fixed expenses, the retailer finds that he has more money 
at the end when selling at 87 cents than when selling at 
$1.00. Such judicious use of price cutting may be the major 
24 
factor in determining efficiency. Opponents of price main-
tenance therefore argue that such legislation would elim-
inate efficient retailing and be detrimental to consumer 
interests. 
(2) Price Discrimination ~~Leaders-- While price 
discrimination is not properly a feature of resale price 
maintenance, it does have in some instances a rather inter-
esting connection. To some extent this is probably now 
eliminated by the recent Robinson-Patman Act which forbids 
the sale of goods at differenct prices -to di:fferenct types 
of outlets unless such difference is based on actual differ-
ences in selling costs. 
Before such legislation, and perhaps to some extent now, 
price discrimination did make possible the apparent sale 
below cost of certain items, which many not have been actually 
24. 
~· J p. 23. 
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sold under cost after a consideration of all the elements 
contributing to the actual purchase price on the part of 
certain retailers. This came about through the practice of 
manufacturers who often granted "allowances for advertising" 
to certain retailers, particularly the large chains and de-
partment stores. Such allowances were theoretically intend-
ed to be for ~fide services, such as window displays, 
special sales effort, and other types of selling cooperation. 
In case such allowances were really related to actual sell-
ing expenses incurred by the retail outlet they were un-
questionably justifiable. But frequently, and apparently 
usually, such grants bore no real relation to advertising 
expense, and hence were nothing more than a concealed dis-
count which amounted to price discrimination. With such an 
advantage in the matter of discounts, retailers who lumped 
all discounts together when considering the invoice cost to 
them, naturally could afford to sell these items at prices 
apparently below their average operating coats. It can thus 
be seen that price discrimination of this type contributes 
25 
to the problem of price cutting. Here the true problem orig-
inated among the manufacturers who indulged in such tactics. 
If it is assumed that they were sincerely interested in 
maintaining their goodwill, then they became unwittingly 
their own malefactors. Independents who objected to below 
25 Ibid., pp. 51, 52. 
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cost selling on the part of their competitors would have 
done better to condemn the manufacturer than the chains and 
departments which naturally could hardly be blamed for tak-
ing advantage of such favors. While the issue is essentially 
that of price discrimination, it evidently did influence price 
cutting and hence had a direct bearing on resale price main-
tenance agitation. 
(c) Problems~ Resale Price Maintenance-- It was pointed 
out earlier that resale price maintenance is largely the re-
sult of the causal factor of price cutting. When a manufac-
turer on his own initiative or at the instigation of inter-
ested groups of retailers attempts to use resale price main-
tenance to combat the influence of price cutting, he is met 
with some very perplexing economic problems. An indication 
of these problems is found in the Federal Trade Commission's 
Reuort on Resale Price Maintenance which was prepared at the 
' -
time of the proposed Capper-Kelley bill to give Federal appro-
val to the practice. Although that bill has been superseded 
by the more recent adoption of the Miller-Tydings Act the 
economic problems analyzed at that time were still present 
when the later legislation on this matter was passed, and a 
study of some of these questions is essential to a complete 
understanding of the nature of resale price maintenance. 
(1) Determination £f.Retail Margins-- Most troublesome 
of the problems confronting the manufacturer and retailer 
under conditions of resale price maintenance is the deter-
mination of the margin to allow retail outlets. The desirable 
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criterion for setting dealer margins would appear to be the 
costs of operation of the dealers handling the product. Owing 
to the rigidity of the prices under resale price maintenance, 
the margins would have to be set even more carefully than 
under competitive conditions. The real difficulty arises 
from the fact that there are wide variations in operating 
costs among dealers, and also from the fact that a retailer's 
cost of selling a particular article may vary from his own 
average selling costs. 
To illustrate concretely the possible effect of resale 
price maintenance on dealers and to indicate the problems 
involved for the manufacturer, the following section is 
quoted from the Federal Trade Commission's Report 2a ~-
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~ Price Maintenance. The example cited is of course hy-
pothetical; but since it is based to some extent on sta-
tistical data, and since it does indicate the nature of the 
problems involved, it is worth consideration. 
" ••• 319 drug stores having an average expense of 27.3% 
of net sales and an average margin of 33.1%, made an average 
of less than 6% on sales and 11.4% on investment. Should 
the manufacturers feel that this rate of return was fair 
and reasonable, and decide to allow the retailer a mark-up 
of say 34% on their produc·ts' what would be the effect on 
some of the individual drug stores included in the tabula-
tion? Of course the effect of such action by but one manu-
facturer would be slight. If, however, resale price main-
tenance became general and an average retail margin of 34% 
prevailed for all drug store items, the effec:ts, based on 
retailers' reports received ( •••• )may be computed. 
26 pp. 85-87. 
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"Of course it is not likely that resale prices of all 
articles would be controlled, and it is not logical to as-
sume that the percentages of expenses or the percentages of 
mark-up would be uniform for all commodities sold by drug-
gists, or that all conditions other than mark-up would re-
main unchanged. The manufacturers themselves would doubt-
less be met with an almost insolvable problem if they tried 
to fix their several mark-ups to effect a composite result 
which would be fair to the retailers, because the conditions 
of retailers are so varied. The following illustrations of 
what might be assumed to happen under certain hypotheses is 
intended rather to bring out in a concrete way, the nature 
of some of the reactions that might occur under the assumed 
conditions rather than probable quantitative results. On a 
34% margin, 43, or over one-eighth of the 319 drug stores 
reporting, would show a loss. 
"In all, 130 concerns, or over 40% of those reporting, 
would be adversely affected. Some of these would have their 
profits lessened, the profits of some would be changed to 
losses, and some would show increased losses. Considering 
next the merchant whose cost of do~ng business was the low-
est, viz., 6.9% of net sales, this drug~ist's report indi-
cated that he made a net profit of 30.3% on his investment. 
His average mark-up was 26.9%. His net profit on investment 
on a 34% margin would be increased to over 40%. The mer-
chant who reported expenses accounting for only 9.6% of net 
sales, reported an average margin of only 13% and showed a 
net profit on investment of 17.4%. Should his margin be 
increased to 34%, his return on investment would jump to 
125% ••••••• Considering companies reporting high expenses, 
(one} concern reported a rate of 39.3%. This druggist, with 
a margin of 39.7%, made a profit on investment of six-tenths 
of 1%. Should his margin be reduced to 34% he would lose 
nearly 7% on his investment ••••••• As a group, the drug stores 
whose sales ranged from $70,000 to $100,000 in 1927 would not 
be affected by the change to a 34% margin. The ninth and 
eleventh groups ($15,000 to $20,000; and under $10,000) would 
have their margins slightly decreased. All other groups would 
be benefited to some extent." 
Since resale price maintenance would apply more general-
ly to nationally-advertised items on which the lowest margins 
are found, the Commission feels that the adoption of this 
legislation might result in inc-reased margins on these goods. 
With reference to private and little known brands, it con-
cludes that resale price maintenance would make it possible 
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to raise margins on these articles without getting them com-
petitively out of line with nationally-advertised products. 
However, it also sees the possibility that with the elimina-
tion of the use of branded merchandise as loss leaders that 
the less well-known items might be pushed as leaders. Fin-
ally, the Commission sagaciously terminates the discussion 
with the non-commital remark that "It seems impossible, 
however, to foretell even with approximate certainty the re-
27 
sults of resale price maintenance." 
Certainly the examination of the possible effects of 
resale price maintenance indicates that there is evidence 
that those who argue that this practice would result in the 
perpetuation of the less efficient dealers have some support 
;' 
for their contentio~. It is also evident, however, that 
without this price legislation there existed dealers of var-
ious degrees of efficien~y. Therefore it can hardly be said 
that resale price maintenance alone would be responsible for 
the existence of some firms which were less efficient than 
others. Also if the possibility foreseen by the Commission 
that prices on less well-known goods might be reduced as a 
result of resale price maintenance, should be correct the 
net effect on prices to the public might not be materially 
changed. 
The issue still exists of deciding how to cope with dif-
27~., p. 87. 
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ferent types of dealers in setting margins based on costs. 
The effect of setting a uniform margin for all merchants 
was pointed out above. However, should the effort be made 
to adjust margins to cost, other problems present themselves. 
In response to a Commission questionaire inquiring about the 
preference of a one-price arrangement for all retailers, the 
28 
predominating sentiment favored the single fixed price. The 
problem of policing a different level for different types of 
stores was one objection for a flexible arrangement. Also 
influencing this opinion was the fact that the determination 
of operating costs of different outlets is practically im-
possible of accurate estimate. Finally there was the argu-
ment that while a variable price related to costs was the-
oretically desirable, in practice the lowest price at which 
a giv·en trade-marked article is sold in a given market tends 
to become the only price at which volume sales of that ar-
ticle are possible. 
Vlliile drug stores were cited as presenting a problem to 
the effective and satisfactory use of resale price mainte-
nance, this group of dealers was intended merely to be illus-
trative of the general problems encountered under conditions 
of resale price maintenance. A similar situation ex ists in 
29 
all branches of distribution. Drugs and allied products 
28
• 'Ibid. t p. 154. 
29.see, for example, the problems of grocery stores, p. 
87; stationery stores, p. 89; and department stores, 
p. 93. 
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handled by drug stores have, as a matter of fact, been sub-
ject to more severe price cutting than many other types of 
merchandise; and the Retail Druggist Associations have ac-
tively sponsored resale price maintenance legislation. The 
citing of the problems peculiar to the drug store distribu-
tors, therefore, has especial significance. 
But another obstacle is present. Foods, drugs, hard-
ware items, etc., may be handled by a number of different 
types of outlets, as for example, by drug stores, hardware 
stores, and department and grocery stores. While within 
one type of outlet it was apparent that cost variations were 
tremendous, variations between types of dealers widens the 
problem to perplexing proportions. Also, within each class 
of merchants, different types of merchandising are found. 
For example, there might be chain outlets, independent out-
lets, service retailers, giving delivery and credit, and 
cash and carry retailers. Each of these operates on diff-
erent expense scales. The problem of the manufacturer in 
arriving at a resale price satisfactory to all concerned 
is therefore extremely dif'f.icult. If he elec:ts a price sat-
isfactory to the inefficient, high cost merchant, and there-
by eliminates the price advantage of the so-called aggressive 
retailers (Macy's for example), he may incur the disfavor of 
these dealers who will then push their own private brands or 
even agitate actively against the price-maintained goods. 
On the other hand, if' the resale price is set low enough to 
suit the more aggressive retailers, the independents may re-
fuse to support the merchandise. 
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Further complications arise when the distribution in-
volves wholesalers as well as retailers. The same type of 
problem is present among wholesale outlets as was evident 
with respect to retailers. This problem will not be se-
parately treated since it would involve needless repetition. 
It should be recognized, however, that it makes the diffi-
culties of resale price maintenance even greater. These 
problems will be viewed again when considering the results 
of the Fair Trade Laws. 
d. Competition Versus Monopoly-- Oddly enough both 
proponents and opponents of resale price maintenance profess 
faith in the competitive system. They subscribe to the 
so-called autor~tic economic system where competition serves 
as the regulator of price and production. This type of econ-
omy holds to the belief that the greatest efficiency is poss-
ible under free competition. In the absence of governmental 
or other control, there must be some device which regulates 
the flow of capital into the most productive channels and 
results in the production of goods of the most economic value. 
It is held that competition serves in this regulative capacity. 
Under this system people are free to produce what they 
please and as much as they please; they can sell what they 
wish and at whatever price they can get; they can buy what 
they desire and at prevai-ling prices. Such a completely 
laissez faire system is subject only to the controlling in-
fluence of price and profit. Price, for instance, determines 
whether one should invest in this or that enterprise. High 
prices for the product of some industry means profitable 
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business, and capital flows into that industry until fin-
ally the increased supply of goods resulting from this ad-
ded investment forces prices down and drives capital out 
and leaves it free to flow into other channels under the in-
ducement of erpectantly higher profits. 
Behind all this shifting of capital and fluctuations 
in price is the ever present factor of competition. Some-
thing has to guide the output and prices of goods and deter-
mine who should receive the profits and the goods. In de-
fault of a planned economy by the government or some other 
agency, the regulating factor is competition. The prime 
function of competition is as a regulator of production and 
indirectly of prices. 
Much has been written and said both to condemn and praise 
such a scheme. It is not within the province of this work 
to pass judgment on the effectiveness of any particular type 
of economy. But it is of interest and importance to recog-
nize that even under conditions of greatest competition, the 
most ardent supporters of a laissez faire system willingly 
submit to a certain degree of control. Vfuen competition 
fails to work effectively in some industry, such, for instance, 
as public utilities, it is generally deemed in the best in-
terests of society that that competition be regulated artifi-
cially. Furthermore, it is recognized that a distinction 
exists between free and fair competition. Therefore, a Fed-
eral Trade Commission has been established to insure the ex-
istence of fair competition. Such laws as the Sherman and 
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Clayton acts have been designed to prevent monopoly, an ob-
vious contradiction of competition, but a result that appar-
ently develops from unregulated competition. 
With this background in mind, it becomes evident that 
those who favor a competitive society, with a limited degree 
of supervision, may often approve or disapprove of resale 
price maintenance as it seems to them to eliminate or per-
petuate the competittve factor. Since they both agree on the 
desired end, the dispute arises over the means of effecting 
that end. 
Advocates of resale price maintenance argue that its a-
doption would be the surest guarantee of effective compe-
tition; that without it, monopoly would result. The type of 
resale price maintenance which they advocate is one volun-
tarily controlled by those concerned. ~fuether this is bet-
ter than governmental control is again subject to argument. 
However, the essential point for consideration here is that 
this device is advanced, not as an effort to abolish the 
laissez faire system, but rather to insure its success. 
The essence of the argument in favor of resale price 
maintenance as a means of preventing monopoly is rendered 
by the following quotation: 
"President Wilson urged most wisely that, instead of 
sanctioning and regulating private monopoly, we should reg-
ulate competition. Undoubtedly statutes must be enacted to 
secure adequate and effective regulation; but shall our 
courts prohibit voluntary regulation or competition by those 
engaged in business? And is not the one-price system for 
trade-marked articles a most desirable form of regulation? 
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"The competition attained by prohibiting the producer 
of a trade-marked article from maintaining his established 
price offers nothing substantial. Such competition is su-
perficial merely. It is sporadic, temporary, delusive. It 
fails to protect the public where protection is most needed. 
It is powerless to prevent the trust from fixing extortionate 
prices for its product. The great corporation with ample cap-
ital, a perfected organization and large volume of business 
can establish its ovm agencies or sell direct to the consu-
mer, and is in no danger of having its business destroyed by 
price-cutting among retailers. But the prohibition of price-
maintenance imposes upon the small and independent produc;ers 
a serious handicap. Some avenue of escape must be sought by 
them; and it may be found in combination •••• The process of 
exterminating the small independent retailer already hard-
pressed by capitalistic combinations •••• would be greatly 
accelerated by such a movement. Already the displacement of 
the small independent business man by the huge corporation 
with its myriad of employees, its absentee ownership and its 
financier control presents a grave danger to our democracy. 
The social loss is great; and there is no evident gain; but 
the process of .capitalizing free Americans is not an inev-
itable one. It is not even in accord with the natural law 
of business. It is largely the result of unwise, man-made, 
privilege-creating law, which has stimulated existing tenden-
cies to inequality instead of discouraging them. Shall we, 
under the guise of protecting competition, further foster 
monopoly by creating immunity for the price cutters? 
"Americans should be under no illusions as to the value 
of the effect of price-cutting. It has been the most potent 
weapon of monopoly--a means of killing the small rival to which 
the great trusts have resorted most frequently. It is so 
simple, so effective. Far-seeing organized capital secures 
by this means the co-operation of the short-sighted unorgan-
ized consumer to his ovm undoing. Thoughtless or weak, he 
yields to the temptation of trifling immediate gain, and, 
selling his birthright for a mes~ of pottage, becomes him-
self an instrument of monopoly."~O 
First of all, the objection was raised that the huge 
corporations by virtue of their capital are able to effect 
resale price maintenance through the device of agencies or 
licenses. The smaller manufacturer is penalized merely be-
cause he lacks the necessary capital. But more important, 
30•Brandeis, Q£. Cit., p. 259. 
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perhaps, was the argument that the type of competition aris-
ing out of price-cutting is not true competition. Rather, 
it is claimed to be an insidious weapon of monopoly which 
drives out the small merchant. With the disappearance of 
smaller dealers, competition also passes away. In other 
words, competition is its own enemy; therefore resale price 
maintenance, instead of being detrimental to competition, 
really serves to perpetuate it. 
Further support to the claim that cutthroat price com-
petition is really only a delusive type of competition since 
it undermines the possibility of wide distribution which 
alone allows true competitive conditions is given by the 
book interests in their fight for resale price maintenance 
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legislation. Low prices, they assert, result not from price 
cutting, but from wide distribution, which makes possible a 
greater market, volume produc:tion, and hence lower costs. 
In the long run the consumer loses when loss leaders are used. 
A well-known economist and propagandist in favor of re-
sale price maintenance points out that the high mortality in 
retail businesses is borne by the public in higher prices on 
al·l that they buy, and also that the tendency to monopoly is 
shown by the increasing concentration of business in the hands 
of chain store systems. As evidence he cites the following 
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figures: 
3l·Publishers' Weekly, Sept. 23, 1933. 
32
·william H. Ingersoll, "An Economist Looks at Fair Trade", 
Journal, Nat. Assn. of Retail Druggists, June 16, 1938. 
Groceries and Meats: 
Drugs: 
Cigars and Tobacco: 
Shoes: 
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1929 
32.2 
18.5 
25.1 
38.0 
1933 
43.7 
25.1 
33.9 
46.2 
These figures are designed to show the increased degree of 
concentration of business in the hands of the chain stores 
in this country. 
However, considered more critically, it is not self-
evident that these costs of retail mortality which bear 
heavily on the public are caused as a result of the absence 
of resale price maintenance which by inference he claims to 
be the case. Similarly it cannot be said that this factor 
alone caused greater concentration of business • 
. Against the argument that competition would be elim-
inated by the adoption of resale price maintenance is the 
counter claim that competition would still be prevalent a-
mong producers. Resale price maintenance is therefore held 
to be a preserver of competition, since by eliminating price 
cutting, it prevents monopoly in the field of distribution 
and alsq in the produetive phase of our economy since price 
cutting, by injuring the reputation of a manufacturers' 
goods, ultimately curtails his market, and may even drive 
him out of business; whereas, the larger corporations, with 
an aggregate of capital at their disposal, can maintain their 
goodwill by the use of such a device as agency selling. How-
ever, strong arguments against resale price maintenance, which 
purport to show that it would itself be a monopolistic device, 
are also voiced. 
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Opponents of resale price maintenance reason that its 
adoption would eliminate the competitive factor and produce 
monopolistic conditions. Naturally competition in their 
opinion is restricted to price competition. Should resale 
price maintenance become effective then competition among 
retailers would be lost, and the incentive for efficiency 
woul d likewise disappear since the retailer would be unable 
to attract new trade through lower prices made possible as 
33 
a result of lower costs. Further strong evidence that re-
sale price maintenance might be monopolistic is furnished 
by the Federal Trade Commission whose survey indicated that 
even back in the twenties before the current efforts at 
Fair Trade, it was the trade associations, representing 
some of the extensively organized branches of the retail 
trade, which urged the enactment of resale price maintenance 
laws to protect small merchants from the inroads of large 
distributing agencies which cut prices on leaders. Their 
defense was that it was in the public interest to the inde-
pendent retailer in business. Opponents of this legislation 
insist, however, that if resale prices are high enough to 
allow all dealers to stay in business the effect would be 
to retain an excessive number of inefficient retailers and 
thus tend to spread the volume more thinly among dealers, 
34 
and consequently burden the public with increased costs. 
33•saul Nelson, "Fixed Prices and the Consumer" Harper's, 
August, 1937. 
34•F.T.C. ~· Q!l., p. 156. 
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Additional information on this point shows that the retail-
ers who opposed resale price maintenance were generally the 
35 
larger concerns and made the larger profits. In other words, 
these concerns which built their businesses on the basis of 
efficiency and resultantly lower prices opposed a law that 
would by its nature give to less efficient d~alers a perma-
nent foothold regardless of their economic value. 
It might be pointed out, however, that the opposite 
conclusion might be drawn from this evidence. That is, it 
might be argued that price cutting, not necessarily on the 
basis of efficiency, but on the ground of larger capital and 
the consequent ability to use the deceptive device of loss 
leader selling actually produced large and profitable bus-
inesses and their opposition to resale price maintenance 
was intended to permit them to hold their position in the 
distributive scheme. The difficulty of accurate conclusions 
in the absence of reliable statistical data is again apparent. 
Interesting and perhaps indicating significant correla-
tion is the fact that whereas in the case of retailers it 
was the larger and more profitable concerns which opposed 
resale price maintenance, in the instance of manufacturers, 
who after all are theoretically the element most desirous 
and most in need of goodwill protection, the opposite is 
true; for here it is found that it is the more profitable 
and larger businesses which favor resale price maintenance. 
The argument usually advanced (an argument of which Jus-
tice Brandeis is especially fond.) in favor of resale price 
35. Thid., p. 83 
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maintenance from the manufacturers' viev~oint is that it 
would put the smaller concerns on a parity with the larger 
producers who were able to maintain their resale prices by 
means other than those available to the small manufacturer, 
It was thus believed to be a preventative of privilege and 
monopoly. In answer, however, the Federal Trade Commission 
reports, "It is significant to note that, so far as the re-
sults for •••• 691 manufacturers are indicative, the strongest 
sentiment for resale price maintenance is not to be found 
either among those who showed losses or among smaller con-
cerns for whose protection it is strongly urged by some of 
its proponents."36 On the other hand, it might be argued 
that it is only the larger and more strongly established 
concerns who have real goodwill interests at stake. In 
other words, it is the national manufacturer who has devel-
oped his reputation on a sufficiently wide basis to make his 
products especially valuable as loss leaders. It may be 
that such manufacturers sincerely believe that price cutting 
is injurious to their production, in accordance with the 
propounded theory that price cutting leads ultimately to 
curtailed output. Again, definite conclusion is impossi.ble. 
Vlhether resale price maintenance would be beneficial to 
competition or would result in its destruction as an effect-
ive regulator remains in the realm of theory, and lack of 
36
·Ibid., p. 19. 
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satisfactory data prohibits accurate appraisal. 
3. In Relation to Consumer Interests-- "Consumer inter-
ests" is perhaps a loose term, for in a sense everyone is 
a consumer; but it is used here to mean the interests of 
the public generally as purchasers of goods, as distinct 
from the interest of a manufacturer in the success of his 
particular business or as opposed to the interest of a dis-
tributor in his business. These people are included as 
consumers, but essentially consideration is given to the 
buying public apart from any ulterior interest in a par-
ticular business. 
Generally speaking, a consumer has at least three in-
terests in the goods he buys. His concern centers about 
quality, service, and price. Price of course is always 
associated with the other two factors. Primarily, then. 
the consumer is interested in the way .in which resale price 
maintenance would affec;t the cost of goods as reflected in 
the price he is forced to pay. Ag~in the dilemma of disa-
greement confronts any analyst of the economics of resale 
price maintenance. Arguments there are to support the con-
tention that resale price maintenance is beneficial to the 
consumer through its tendency to lower prices, insure qua-
lity and provides adequate distribution; and arguments there 
also are to support the opposite view. 
Consumer opinion itself was surveyed by the Federal Trade 
Commission and the results indicated that of 1990 consumers 
who returned questionaires, 72% opposed granting manufacturers 
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37 
the power by contract to maintain resale prices. The 
apparent inference is that seeing trade-marked goods sold 
at different prices by different stores with varying a-
mounts of service features the consumer concludes that he 
is better off under such conditions of competition since 
he can then deal with whatever store best serves his needs 
and derive whatever benefit might acrue from managerial 
efficiency in the form of lower prices. However, the 
sample is obviously small, and even though it might rep-
resent consumer opinion, it does not follow that the op-
inion would ·be economically sound. 
However, those who oppose resale price maintenance do 
advance economic arguments that have much merit. They 
point out that a merchant has three means of lowering his 
prices to consumers. He may do so because of some advan-
tage he may possess in his purchasing; he may do so by 
narrowing his profit; and finally, he may do so by cutting 
the costs of doing business. Upon this last factor rests 
the real argument of the opposition to resale price main-
tenance. For example, they compare independent drug stores 
with department stores which contain drug departments. They 
maintain that under conditions of resale price maintenance 
any price differentials occasioned by the lower costs of the 
department stores, would be eliminated and that the consumer 
37.Ib"d J. • , p. 157 .. 
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would naturally suffer through the inevitable rise in pri-
ces of these commodities. Price competition would thus 
disappear except on the brands that did not fall under the 
resale price contracts. Hence the consumer is denied the 
chance to shop around and secure the lowest prices. They 
would lose whatever price advantage they now have in the 
form of cut prices on identified merchandise. 
Certainly those who support this type of reasoning 
have the full weight of the orthodox conception of economics 
upon which to rest their case. Essentially, they assume 
that the public is best served by a competition that is not 
only free from governmental control, but also free from any 
agreement among the participants themselves in respect to 
the prices at which goods should be sold. Wasteful as the 
system may be, it is nevertheless believed to have long run 
effectiveness. Complete faith in the regulatory effective-
ness of competition forms the main strength of the arguments 
opposing resale price maintenance. 
Nearly everyone schooled in the economic theories of the 
post Adam Smith era can readily appreciate the line of rea-
soning thus outlined by the opponents of the Fair Trade Laws. 
To present the arguments of those who favor resale price -
maintenance requires deeper analysis. It may at first be 
objected that the presentation of the case for resale price 
maintenance is biased since more space is devoted to this 
side of the controversy, but this is only an apparent preju-
dice. More involved analysis is necessary in this instance 
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since the burden of proof rests on those who support the 
Fair Trade Laws. It must be shown by them that the old and 
established system no longer suits all conditions, and that 
resale price maintenance actually is a desirable corrective. 
Most of the arguments in favor of resale pricemainte-
nance have been previously stated in the foregoing sections, 
but a brief re-statement will serve to indicate their rela-
tion to the consumer. The first argument is that the high-
ly acclaimed price competition among retail outlets is in 
reality but a temporary, sporadic, and essentially unsound 
type of competition. This they claim is so since the usual 
technique is for a dealer to sell branded, identifiable 
merchandise as a loss leader, and by thus trading on the 
good will and reputation of the manufacturer to create the 
impression that all goods in the store are sold at compar-
able prices. Actually such is not the case, since a mer-
chant cannot afford to lose on his total sales, and hence 
whatever is forfeited on loss leaders must necessarily be 
recouped on the less well-knmvn items whieh because of iden-
tification difficulties cannot readily be compared to pri-
ces elsewhere. Such practices are considered unfair to the 
consumer who unwittingly becomes the prey of unscrupulous 
dealers. 
Furthermore, it is deemed unsound since as soon as loss 
leader selling is instituted on a trade-marked article, the 
dealers who cannot afford to take a loss because they have 
no other lines on which to recover, tend to stop handling 
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the item. This results in curtailed distribution, which 
not only hurts the manu~acturer, but by causing idle capa-
city, results in increased costs o~ manu~acture, and hence 
the consumer in the long run is ~orced to pay a higher price. 
Also this type o~ selling, which may use a large aggregate 
of capital to ~orce out independent merchants, actually 
gives rise to monopoly with its attendant evils. Still 
more drastic disadvantages that might accompany the use of 
loss leaders are cited by Senator Feld, of New York, who 
contended that it was unsound ~or the retail public to buy 
at cost or below cost since this is reflected in loss of 
employment and lower wages to workers, and i~ we are to 
insure living wages to our workers we must eliminate cut-
38 
throat competition. 
vVhat these arguments really mean is that competition 
as it has long been understood no longer always serves the 
public as a reliable regulator of prices and production. 
Consum.er interests were jeopardized by the uncontrolled 
competitive conditions in the railroads in the last century; 
and in the present century competition has been found unde-
sirable in other utilities. The losses resulting from the 
waste of unbridled competition seemed to demand some sort 
o~ regulation. The answer came in the ~orm of governmental 
control o~ these agencies. Similarly, argue the proponents 
38Publishers' Weekly, p. 811, Febl 13, 193?. 
-51-
of resale price maintenance, it has been found undesirable 
to allow price competition of the loss leader kind to con-
tinue. Control is needed not as a contradiction of the 
orthodox system but to insure its perpetuation. Only in this 
instance instead of governmental control what is advocated 
is the legalization of voluntary control. 
In answer to the argument that resale price maintenance 
would result in greatly enhanced prices to the consumer the 
advocates of this legislation reply that the existence of 
competition among the producers of price-maintained goods, 
and the threat of competition from private brand merchandise 
would serve to keep prices i n line. Specific instances are 
cited to prove that the consumer will not be harmed by in-
. creased prices. 
In July of 1933 the Colgate Palmolive Peet Co. started 
its profit stabilization plan by which it stressed the idea 
of less spectacular selling and of making each sale pay its 
share of overhead. It is claimed that in a year of operation 
the plan demonstrated its feasibility. A ten-day test con-
ducted in 146 drug stores revealed that all but nine of them 
had more than doubled sales on the Colgate Palmolive Peet 
products. Although the former loss leader items sold at a 
profit, the average of prices to the consumer actually were 
39 
lower than before. 
39.B i 
us ness~' p. 10, Dec. 15, 1934. 
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Wartime experience was also cited to prove that con-
sumers will not become victims of unreasonable manufacturers 
under conditions of resale price maintenance. In 191? 
Printers' Ink conducted a study which showed that price-
maintained goods remained nearly stable despite a general 
price rise. Among the companies reporting that their pri-
ces would not be raised were the Diamond Crystal Salt Co. 
40 
and the Bon Ami Co. Of course such claims must be viewed 
sceptically, not only because they represent but a minute 
sample of manufacturers, but because the extent of price 
maintenance was materially less than that contemplated under 
the Fair Trade Laws. 
Booksellers, who were active supporters of the recent 
resale price maintenance legislation, stressed the fact that 
they would not dictate the prices of books under legalized 
resale price maintenance. That function will be performed 
by the publisher, who will set a price consistent with real 
costs since both he and the author are interested in the wi-
dest possible distribution. Cheap editions are still possible 
and desirable when wide distribution makes them economically 
profitable. Curtailed distribution will result in higher con-
. sumer prices; adoption of resale price maintenance will result 
40
·william H. Ingersoll, "!vir. Roosevelt and Prices" 
, 
Printers' la!, p.58, May 2?, 193?. 
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41 
in free competition and the prevention of monopoly. 
Obviously no conclusion is possible on the basis of 
opinion evidence. The attempt here has been merely to an-
alyze the various aspects of resale price maintenance and 
to acquaint the reader with the type of economic argument 
raised on both sides of the issue. That a real economic 
question is at stake is undeniable. Until reliable data 
are available, however, no honest conclusion can definitely 
be made. It is sufficient to point out the possibilities 
contingent upon adoption or rejection of resale price main-
tenance legislation. 
A somewhat more definite appraisal of the effects of 
the Fair Trade Laws to date may be made at the end of this 
study, but before considering the results of this legisla-
tion attention will be given to the legal status of resale 
price maintenance both prior to the Fair Trade Laws and af-
ter their adoption. 
41. 
Cedric Crowell, "The Case for Maintained Prices", 
Publishers' Weekly, Feb. 10, 1934. 
CHAPTER II 
SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE 
II S OlliE LEGAL ASPECTS OF' RESALE PRICE MAI NTENANCE 
A. Resale Price Maintenance under AcL'llinistrati ve Law 
The relationship that should hold between government 
and economics has been a matter of age-old dispute from 
? lato down through the more modern era of mercantilism to 
the late period of laissez-f aire and the final unclas s ified 
present-day situation. Our own national economy has been 
t hought of as one of laissez-faire, but even here as early 
as the 19th century government has stepped into the economic 
s phere and at present seems to be heading more and more to-
ward p ermanent and tangible control of the national economy . 
?;fore specifically, efforts were made to curb the grovvth 
of monopoly as being something antagonistic to a completely 
automatic economic society. True, government intervention 
in business was deemed contrary to the precepts of a free 
economic system, but government intervention for the pur-
pose of perpetuating a competitive society was believed to 
be defensible. 
As a prelude to later legislation , there was enacted 
1 
in 1890 the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, where the effort to pre-
serve an individualistic, competitive society is i ndic ated 
by the wording of a part of this law which r e ads, 
1 
26 U. S . Stat. at L. , ~· 209. 
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"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or 
commerce among the several states or with foreign 
nations, is hereby declared to be illegal.n 
Court interpretation was the final authority of this 
act, and in 1911 the force of such interpretation is dis-
covered in the celebrated St andard Oil case in which the 
doctrine of the "rule of reason" was introduced. 'l'his ap-
plied to combinations in restraint of trade and of tenden-
cies to create a monopoly, for it had become obvious that 
the decision as to whether a combination restrained trade 
was a matter of judgement. The old theory of preserving 
unhindered competition was to that extent compromised. 
There then arises the question of the status of re-
sale price maintenance in a theoretically competitive so-
ciety, and especially under the law that was designed to 
preserve that type of system. If not a final an~1er, at 
least a strong hint relative to the position of resale 
price maintenance under this law was rendered in 1911 by 
the United States SUpreme court in the case of the Dr. 
2 
Miles Medical Co., vs. John D. Park and Sons Co. The 
Miles Company had established a system of contracts be-
tween itself and wholesale and retail dealers by which 
the manufacturer tried to control the prices at which 
these agents sold its produ ct and also to control the 
prices of all sales by dealers whether purchasers or sub-
2
·220 u.s. 373. 
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purchasers of their produc::ts. The court held that such 
action eliminated all competition in fixing the amount 
which consumers were forced to pay for these goods, and 
hence it amounted to restraint of trade, which made these 
contracts invalid both at common law and in so far as it 
affec:.ts interstate commerce under the Sherman Act. The 
manufacturer was not entitled to control the prices on 
all sales of his own product in restraint of trade. As 
a final gesture of righteousness the court added that 
agreements or combinations between dealers having for the 
sole purpose the destruction of competitio~ and the fixing 
of prices are injurious to the public interest, and hence 
void. 
In defense of its policy, the company advanced the 
typical arguments as outlined in the previous chapter. It 
had, it contended, built up good will and that this good 
will was the reason for the demand for its products. When 
cut price stores sold its products at bargain prices this 
good will was undermined, its reputation destroyed, and 
sales depleted. This resulted from the attitude of retail 
druggists who believed they could not make a profit at cut 
prices and who consequently refused to stock the merchandise 
of the Miles Company and .even passed off substitute products. 
The court obviously was passing on a matter of econo-
mic policy. It did not condemn the methods of maintaining 
resale prices, but attacked the practice itself. The court 
really became a legislative body when it made this decision. 
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Resale price maintenance thus received a severe blow, and 
it became obvious that the practice was considered detri-
mental to the public interest since it tended to monopoly. 
It is interesting in light of what has later trans-
pired to note that Justice Holmes dissented from the major-
ity opinion in this case. He believed it best to let people 
manage their own business as they wish unless the ground for 
interference is clear. He believed also that an exaggerated 
importance is attached to the effectiveness of competition 
in the produetion and distribution of an article as a deter-
minant of fair prices for the product. What really fixes 
the price, he claims, is the competition of conflicting de-
sires. The public does not stand to benefit by the court's 
allowing knaves to cut reasonable prices for purposes of 
their own and thereby destroy the production and sale of an 
article that it is assumed that the public should be able 
to get. Certainly here there is more than surface reason-
ing. 
1. The Federal Trade Commission--- Inspired by the 
current feeling that competition was a satisfactory con-
troller of the national economy~ and with the added stim-
ulation of the decisions in the Standard Oil and tobacco 
cases of 1911, a committee on Interstate Commerce recom-
mended in 1913 that Congress prohibit certain types of 
combination and also create a commission to aid in the en-
3 
forcement of the anti-trust acts. The result of this 
3
·seager and Gulick Trust and Corporation Problems, 
pp. 413,414, (1929). ----------
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agitation was the formation of the Federal Trade Commission 
and the enactment of the Clayton Act. In its efforts to pre-
vent the elimination of competition the Commission was to 
serve the same purpose in regard to industrial combination 
that the Interstate Commerce Commission does with common 
4 
carriers and the Federal Reserve Board with the banks. 
For the purposes of this study, the essential power 
of the Commission lies in the famous seetion 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act which reads, " •••• unfair me-
thods of competition in commerce are hereby declared to be 
5 
unlawful". It reads further that "The Commission is hereby 
empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, 
or corporations { ••• ) from using unfair methods of compe-
tition in commerce." 
There thus has been established an agency of adminis-
trative law to prosecute and prevent certain types of com-
petition deemed to be unfair. Obviously, such a phrase as 
"unfair methods of competition" is subject to wide varia-
tion in interpretation. As best it could, the Commission 
set out to fulfill is somewhat indistinct duty. Among the 
practices that it held to be unfair was that of resale price 
maintenance. 
It might be well to recall that procedurally the Com-
4
·Ibid., p. 423. 
5·~ .s. Stat. at L., p. 719. 
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mission first issues a complaint either on its own account 
or upon request from some other party. This complaint con-
tains a statement of the charges and sets a date for the 
hearing. The Commission by investigation decides whether 
it has reason to believe that there has been a violation of 
Section 5, and if it so decides, the complaint is sent out 
to the party concerned. Following the complaint, the Com-
mission Council prepares a trial and presents testimony. 
Finally, the Commission issues an order, but it~ scope is 
limited to merely requiring the respondent to "cease and 
desist" from a certain act. It can prohibit only the me-
thod of competition charged in the complaint. Damages 
cannot be assigned, and if the practice has already caused 
injury, no relief can be given. These orders are not self-
enforcing, but require the Commission to apply to the Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals for enforcement. Likewise, the re-
spondent may obtain a review by the same court to set aside 
the order. The court's order either sets aside, affirms, 
or modifies the order of the Commission. If affirmation 
6 
occurs, the court can compel obedience. 
Against this background, it will be well now to trace 
some or the actual decisions of the Commission in the mat-
ter of resale price maintenance, to analyze its attitude 
6.For further detail on Commission procedure see 
Gerard c. Henderson, The Federal Trade Commission, 
(1924), Chapter II. 
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on the trade practice, and to see how the courts have in-
fluenced the legality of this method of competition. 
2. Commission Decisions ££Resale Price Maintenance---
In a broad sense, the Commission has contended that this 
method of competition is illegal under Section 5 of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act. Briefly, the Commission has 
declared that this sort of competition favors the high cost 
and inefficient dealers, eliminates price competition, and 
thereby produc·es higher prices for the public. The benefits 
of free competition are supposed to have been lost. In 
considering the Commission's attitude, however, it is neces-
sary to realize that here the Commission is determining 
policy and advocating a particular type of economic theory. 
The study of some cases will make clearer the regard of the 
Commission for this method of competition. 
As an initial case that of the Cudahy Packing Company 
7 
in 1918 is illustrative of the inefficient dealer argument. 
The Cudahy Company was engaged in the manufacture and sale 
of a cleansing powder, and in its sales scheme adopted the 
practice of fixing the prices at which its product should be 
resold by whol esalers and in turn by retailers. It compelled 
adherence to these established prices by refusing to sell 
to those who failed to follow suit. However, the established 
7
·F.T.C. v. The Cudahy Packing Co., 1 F.T.C.D. 199 (1918). 
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prices were more than enough to insure a fair profit. 
(No mention is made of what a "fair profitn means). The 
Commission ordered the respondent to cease from directly 
or indirectly recommending, requiring, or bringing about 
~any other means, the resale by dealers of the respondent's 
product at prices established by the Cudahy Packing Company. 
While the means of carrying out the scheme are emphasized, 
the Commission seems primarily concerned over the high cost 
and inefficient dealers who benefit by this system. In its 
findings it says that the effect of this price fixing has 
been and is: 
"'ro secure for respondent ( ••• ) on its 'Old Dutch 
Cleanser', the trade of jobbers and other who l esalers and 
especially the relatively higher cost and more inefficient 
jobbers ( ••• ) constituting the bul k of the jobbing and 
wholesa l e trade ( ••• )protecting such jobbers( ••• ) against 
the price competition of other jobbers and wholesalers and 
especially the rslatively lower cost and more efficient 
establishments." 
But the classic case of resale price maintenance, and 
one that brilliantly reveals the Commission's attitude and 
conditions it later actions in view of court interpretation 
is that of the F.T.C. v. the Beechnut Packing Company in 
9 
1919. The facts in the case were: The respondent was en-
gaged in the manufacture and sale of chewing gum and other 
products. In marketing these products it adopted a resale 
8 
• Ibid. J p • 2.09 • 
9.1 F.T.C.D. 506 (1919). 
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price maintenance plan by these means: (1) indicated to 
distributors the prices at which its products should be 
resold; (2) used a scheme of marking its goods to facili-
tate tracing any dealer by whom products had been sold at 
cut prices; (3) utilized distributors as cooperative agents 
in enforcing its policy by having them report violators of 
this system; (4) refused to sell to distributors who failed 
to adhere to the established price. 
The Commission held this to l:J:.e unfair as a violation 
of Sec.:tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act on grounds 
as follows: (1) It was done with the intent and effect of 
suppressing competition in the manufacture sale, and market-
ing of its products and with the intent of eliminating price 
competition among its dealers; (2) it was the purpose of the 
company to provide a profit for all "selected" distributors; 
(3) it obtained the cooperation of distributors in effecting 
this policy; (4) gross profit margins are allowed not only 
large enough to induce dealers to handle these produc,ts, but 
larger than necessary to enable ).ower cost and more efficient 
dealers to resell and make a profit, thereby protecting high 
cost and inefficient dealers at the expense of lower cost and 
efficient dealers, and preventing the elimination of the former 
through the means of price competition;(5) other manufacturers-
in self-defense--are forced to adopt similar tactics to re-
tain the r.avor of jobbers;(6) the public suffers by result-
antly higher prices. 
The Commission apparently feels that this practice runs 
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counter to the common c6ncepts of orthodox economics since 
competition between wholesal e and retail dealers is suppos-
edly eliminated. At all hazards, ~n economic status quo 
must be perpetuated, and full faith retained in a competitive 
system. No effort is made to analyze the competitive condi-
tions that would result in the absence of resale price main-
tenance. It is merely assumed that the result would be de-
sirable and effective and to the interest of all concerned. 
It should also be carefully noted that in its zeal to pro-
tect competition, the Commission seemingly neglects the fact 
that under conditions of resale price maintenance competi-
tion might still prevail among producers. In other words, 
the analysis appears to be somewhat incomplete. 
This case was first brought up in the Circuit Court 
of Appeals where the order of the Commission was set aside; 
later, in 1922, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court, 
10 
but ordered a modification of the Commission's order. The 
Supreme Court claimed that the resale price maintenance was 
not itself an unfair method of competition, but what was un-
fair was the method of maintaining the prices. The reason-
ing of the Court reveals that it probably was not as progres-
sive as its decision would at first indicate. It says it is 
for the Courts, not the Commission, ultimately to decide 
what constitutes unfair methods of competition. These words 
(as quoted from the Gratz case by the Supreme Court) are 
10. 
257 u.s. 441 (1922). 
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"clearly inapplicable to practices never before regarded 
as opposed to good morals because characterized by decep-
tion, bad faith, fraud ( ••• ) or as against public policy 
because of their dangerous tendency unduly to hinder compe-
tition or create a monopoly. The Act was certainly not 
intended to fetter free and fair competition as coiD~only 
understood and practiced by honorable opponents in trade". 
The Court states that were the Beechnut Company's policy 
such as to hinder competition or create monopoly, it would 
be within the power of the Cormnission to declare it unlaw-
ful. Under the Sherman Act a trader can sell or refuse to 
sell as he chooses to one who refuses to resell at prices 
fixed by himself. But he cannot go beyond that, and by 
contract, expressed or implied, "unduly obstruct the free 
and natural flow of commerce". More than a mere refusal to 
sell is involved in this case, however, the Court continues; 
but it is the means used to enforce the plan that restrains 
competition. The Commission was correct in prohibiting 
these practices, but its order was "too broad", and should 
only have restrained the respondent from effecting its plan 
by cooperative methods such that the respondent and its dis-
tributors, customers, and agents, try to prevent others 
from securing the respondent's products at prices less than 
those established by it. 
The Court was merely allowing the trader the right to 
sell to whom he pleased, and was not passing judgement on 
the policy of resale price schemes. Only to that extent was 
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it more progressive than the Commission. The Commission 
looked not only at the methods involved, but stepped into 
the realm of economic policy and took a hand in shaping 
it--by passing an unqualified judgement on a competitive 
practice. The Commission appears to be considering fair 
competition as competition that effectively regulates our 
economic system, and which is consistent with orthodox econ-
omic theory. Again however, it must be pointed out that the 
Commission is naive in accepting the doo:trine that the ab-
sence of resale price maintenance means that ideal competi-
tive conditions exist; and also, it is somewhat superficial 
when it apparently refuses to rec:ognize that even under a 
scheme of resale price maintenance competition may still 
exist among producers. It appears to believe that any ef-
fort to control competitive conditions by private business 
is nec;essarily evil. 
The effect of .this decision is indicated by the fact 
that 38 other cases involving resale price maintenance were 
not prosecuted by the Federal Trade Commission. because it 
11 
felt it to be useless in light of this court interpretation. 
Further evidence of the Court's effect on the Commission's 
action is seen in the .case of the Mishawaka Woolen Manufac-
turing Company which was prosecuted earlier for a resale 
11
·Thomas c. Blaisdell Jr.,~ Federal Trade Commission, 
p.62, (1932). 
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price scheme, but in 1924 the Commission modified its order 
to the extent of eliminating the command to cease and desist 
from "refusing or threatening to refuse to sell to dealers 
12 
because of their failure to maintain such prices. This mo-
dified order came as a result of the Supreme Court's decis-
ion in the Beechnut case. 
More explicit statement of the effect of resale price 
maintenance on the competition and a good example of the 
tempering of the Commission's orders out of deference to 
the attitude of the court is given in the case of the F.T.c. 
13 
vs. the Cream of vVheat Company. In fixing its resale prices 
this company based them on the margin of the average ~· 
This tends to bear out the Commission's contention that it 
suppresses price competition among dealers, and deprives 
the public of getting the benefit of efficiency of opera-
tion. The order read that it should cease using any co-op-
erative means of enforcing resale prices--not, however, 
ordered to cease refusing to sell to those not conforming. 
Shades here, certainly, of a curtailed commission. 
Here the Commission is apparently interested in main-
taining a func:tional competition, that is, the type of com-
petition that insures the lowest cost in the long run--spe-
cifically, the kind of competition that weeds out the in-
12
·7 F.T.C.D. 410 (1924). 
13
•9 F.T.C.D. 43 (1925)~ 
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efficient and incompetent. Vlliile it is the means of ef-
fecting the scheme that are attacked, that is only because 
of previous Court restrictions. The practice of resale 
price maintenance itself is considered unfair in terms of 
the functional aspects of competition. Such is evidently 
here the case, since it is established as fact that the re-
sale prices are fixed on the margin of average cost--cer-
tainly not the result that should have been expeeted from 
an automatic competitive economy. Caution should howewer 
be taken here not to forget that the Commission is viewing 
the scene entirely in terms of retail or wholesale compe-
tition and is neglecting produc·er competition. It also 
fails to consider the market conditions when uncontrolled 
competition exists. 
A case that reveals the respondent's position in a 
' 
resale price maintenance scheme, and which is significant 
in light of the later contentions of the advocates of the 
recent Fair Trade Laws, is that of the F.T.C. v. Burton 
14 
Bros. and Company, Inc., in 1930. Burton Bros. was a New 
York corporation engaged in buying cotton goods from mills, 
then converting them, and finally selling them to manufac-
turers, jobbers, and retailers. One specially woven cloth 
was developed which they sold as "Burton's Irish Poplin". 
Many thousands of dollars were spent in advertising this 
• 
14 
•14 F.T.C.D. 51. 
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fabric, and as a result, and also because of its inherent 
quality it had become widely and favorably known. (In this 
presentation of facts the Commission suggests a slightly 
sympathetic attitude toward the respondent.) This cloth 
is sold by the respondent to job~ers and retailers for re-
sale by the yard to manufacturers of various types of wear-
ing apparel, mostly to manufac:turers of men's shirts, and 
these manufacturers sell the shirts to retailers with the 
label nBurton' s Irish Poplint' and are finally sold to the 
public under that name. 
In 192? the respondent decided to allow its lahel to 
be used only by retailers who sold the shirts at a price 
fixed by the respondent. By removing the label, however, 
it was free to sell at any price it chose. Apparently here 
the company is merely trying to proteet its good will, and 
derive the benefit of its many thousands of dollars spent 
in advertising. I t refused to supply any shirt manufac-
turer with its label unless it would agree to the conditions 
of resale. It would, however, sell cloth to manufacturers 
without its label if they so desired. It claimed that sel-
ling below the prices fixed by it when using its label was 
an injury to its good will. 
To the Commission this seemed like an unfair method of 
competition--and the Commission reiterates, by implication, 
its absolute faith in orthodox economic theory by charging 
the following effects of their policy: (1) it fixes and 
controls the resale price of shirts; (2} it suppresses 
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competition; and, (3) the purchasers are deprived of the 
advantage in price that would result under a system of 
free competition. 
3. Summary of Legal Status--- It should by now be 
evident that although no express statute pertaining to re-
sale price maintenance was enacted prior to the Fair 1Tade 
Laws of the thirties, this practice was nevertheless re-
garded as unlawful because of its alleged tendency to pro-
mote monopoly and destroy the truly competitive conditions 
believed to be essential to a smoothly running economy. 
Under its general powers to prevent unfair methods of com-
petition the l!'ederal Trade Commission condemned resale 
price maintenance to an early grave by allowing it to fall 
in this classification. The Commission argued that high 
cost and inefficient dealers have been protected under 
this practice; that higher prices have occured; that com-
petition has been eliminated or suppressed; but all these 
culminate in one fairly definite contention of the Commis-
sion, since they are merely signs of what results when free 
competition is destroyed. The fundamental principle that 
the Commission is trying to maintain is that resale price 
maintenance is a practice that in and of itself hinders 
the regulative function of competition by allowing a con-
dition to develop that would not pres~ably arise under a 
completely competitive situation, namely, high cost and 
efficient dealers are allowed to exist, with resultantly 
ill effects on efficient competition and on the public. 
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Although the Courts have forced the Commission to condemn 
resale price maintenance by an indirect route, neverthe-
less the Commission is definitely opposed to the prac-
tice itself. And while the Courts have not expressly 
condemned the practice as such, they have done so in ef-
fect by prohibiting the use of the means of effecting 
resale prices. Apparently both the Commission and the 
Courts have tried to sustain a preconceived notion of 
economics; but they have apparently not considered the 
fact that uncontrolled competition might produce un-
desirable results, both from the manufacturers' and the 
dealers' standpoints. And it should also be borne in 
mind that the Commission has concerned itself chiefly with 
competitive conditions among dealers, giving no attention 
to the good will claims of manufacturers, and apparently 
being interested only in the immediate public gain from 
price cutting, which they naively accept as a laudable 
form of competition. In short, careful scrutiny of all 
the facts seems to be lacking. 
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B. .Hesale .P.rice Haintenance under the N.R.A. 
Only in the isolated case of the Bookseller' Code did 
the administrators of the N.R.A. permit the inclusion of pro-
visions for the adoption of resale price maintenance between 
the manufacturer and the retailer. In all other instances 
the officials consistently refused to approve codes which 
15 
would permit resale price maintenance contracts. In these 
latter instances attempts to control price cutting were made 
by requiring small mark-ups over invoice cost, as in the 
case of the General Retail Code; and in other codes sales 
below cost were prohibited. In figuring the cost, wages, 
transportation, sales and overhead expenses were included, as 
16 
for example in the l umber Code. 
The absence of provisions for contractual resale prices 
was the result of a general hostility to permitting the di-
rect fixing of prices. Presumably the attempt to adjust 
prices by basing them on costs was supposed to be less dan-
gerous than permitting manufacturers to dictate an arbitrary 
resale price for their product. ~fuile the difficulties and 
problems of evolving workable codes is not within the scope 
of this study, it is nevertheless necessary to recognize the 
attempts that were made in this direction, for undoubtedly 
15 
16 
Saul Nelson, "Fixed Prices and the Consumer n , 
Harner's, August, 1937. 
Publishers' Weekly, Sept. 2, 1933. 
?3 
the N.R. A. cast a decided influence on the later efforts to 
establish the now \Vi dely ado pted Fair 'l'rade Laws. 
l. General Retail Code-- I n the summer of 1933 prelimi-
n ary hearings were held on the cetail Code, and in the Fair 
Trade Practice section of the proposed co de the following 
1? 
provisions were included: 
1. No member of the retail tra de shall sell or offer for 
sale merchandise at less than the net invoice cost 
or current market delivered cost, whichever is lower. 
2. Exce ptions to the above were made in cases of bona 
fide clearance, damage, etc. sales. 
3. Deceptive advertising was forbidden, includi ng "bait " 
offers of merchandise. 
'I'he leader in the opposition to the adoption of this 
co de was of course Macy's Department Store in New York, which 
voiced the following objections through its president, 
18 
Percy Straus: 
1. The adoption of the princi9le of price fixing in re-
tail distribution by uniform rninimum prices is un sound. 
2. The retail mechanism whereby a group of stores might 
by combination fix uniform mini mum retail prices at 
a stated percentage above i uvoice cost, which should 
bind all stores regardless of differences in basic 
operations affecting costs and managerial efficiency 
is also unsound. 
However, on October 30, 1933 the Retail Code wa s finally 
adopted, and the provisions regarding loss limitations were 
1? 
Harvard Business School, R. D. 14?8, Me.cy's Price 
Policy, (1938 ) , (privately distributed for classroom 
use. ) 
18 
I bid. 
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interpreted to mean that (1) no retailer should sell mer-
chandise below \111hat it cost him from the wholesaler or manu-
facturer; (2) the cost to retailers should mean net delivered 
cost or current replacement cost, whichever is lower; (3 ) the 
selling price must exce~d an allowance for ¥.rages of store 
labor, l ater set at co s t p lus 10%. 
A prelude to the Fair Trade laws of to-day was evi-
denced when in the preparation of the General Retail Code and 
the Drug Code, discussion occurred on a provision for ad-
mi nistration approval of the "right of contract ,, which would 
for the first time ha ve permitted the retailers legally to 
enter into sales contracts to fix the resale . price of a pro-
duct. As was seen in the provisions of the adopted retail 
code, however, this feature v.' as not ihcluded. 
Among the leaders in the agitation for the adoption of 
codes to protect the small dealers from the price competition 
of the large department and chain stores were the independent 
book dealers, especially those in the New York area. Until 
the adoption of their code, these dealers were governed by 
the general retail code. ~his particular group Was vociferous 
in its objections to this code and even p redicted that it 
would increase the a~ount of price cutting, since under the 
code no merchant may sell h is goods below invoice cost; and 
this means that in the event of a -orice war no store can be 
nfrozen " out, and at the same time it i nvites the use of 
19 
identifiable, fixed price merchandise as loss leaders. 
19 
Publishers' 1Neek1y, Dec. 16, 1933. 
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They further emphasize the fact that loss leader merchants 
will only sell such titles as they choose, and having ex-
hausted t h e publicity value of this type of price cutting, 
can drop the sale of books a ltogether and leave the pub-
lisher without a reasonable outlet to support his business. 
'l 'his is the same type of argument used by the proponents 
of resale price maintenance. l.t should be noted that this 
line of reasoning applies especially to such commodities as 
books, where independent dealers are specialty retailers 
handling only one type of product and having no chance to 
recoup loss es b y higher mark-ups on other merchandise. 
'l'he premonitions of t he booksellers apparently ma-
terialized when after the adoption of the Retail Code there 
ensued a price war among Macy's, G-imbel's, Stern's and 
bloomingdale's in which books were the chief amunition. 
The vode set the ba se price below which sales could not be 
ma de, and these four stores went to tha t base on the best 
s ellers. 'I'he result, according to the book dealer s , is t he 
tendency to eliminate the independent booksellers. This, 
they ironically a ssert, is in snite of t he pronounced in-
tention s of the co des t o avoid mononoly and discrimination 
agains t the small enterprise. 
Examples of the use of book s as loss leaders are found 
in t he sale of some of the best known books of the period 
which formed ideal material for t his purpose. Anthony Ad-
verse, for example, whose list price from t h e publishers was 
$3.00, and whose average invoice cost to dealers was 91.77 
to ~~ 2.00, dependant on the quantity purchased, was sold by 
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four leading department stores for ~> 1. '7'7 or even less. 
s inclair .Lewis' Viork of .!£i, i nvoiced at ~u· l.45-:W l.60, was 
sold by Gi mbel's at ~1.44. Macy's then reduced the price 
to ~31 .35, which was presumably the net delivered cost less 
discount. 1vTeanwhile, publishers had sp ent :[;25, 000 in ad-
20 
vertising the book at ~2.50. 
2. booksellers' Code--'l'hUSL on the eve of the F'air-
Trade Laws and even during the period when "Codes of .l!'air 
Competition" were being promulgated and adopted, the per-
nicious use of price cutting continued. Just as it was the 
practice of price cutting which led to the agitation for 
Fair 'l'rade Laws, it was also to this practice that the Book-
sellers code owed its provision in r e spect to resale price 
mainten ance. After months of desperate pleading and ef-
fective organization , the Booksellers, who represented the 
independent dealers, finally ach ieved their objective when 
on April 13, 1934, the booksellers' Code was at last ap-
21 
proved and became section rrB" of the General Hetail Code. 
'l'he outstanding feature of this code which distinguished 
it from other N.H.A. codes, and the provision which makes 
this code valuable in the history of the legality of resale 
price maintenance was the inclusion of the following sub-
section: 
20 
Ibid., Feb. 10, 1934. 
21-
Ibid., April 14, 1934. 
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"Except as hereinafter . specified, no bookseller shall 
sell or offer for sale any copy or edition of any 
book during the first six (6) months after pub-
licat i on date thereof, ( •••• ) at a price lower than 
the publisher's published price thereof. "22 
Naturally there were e xceptions, such as for bona fide 
clearance sales (except that books under section 3-a of this 
code must first be offered to the publisher at not more than 
the invoice cost), damaged books, and in cases of business 
liquidation. I t is also interesting to note that on 
April 21 the Gonsumers' Advisory eoard of the N.R.A. also 
approved the price maintenance feature of this code. This 
approval came after a long period of objection to the in-
clusion in the codes of price maintenance provisions. 
In defense of its own code, the book trade submits the 
argument that this code does not contain provisions which 
restrict or prevent fair competition. lts conception of 
competition is somewhat broader than the usual definition 
and resembles that of Justice holmes which was cited earlier 
in this work. The book trade says of the Booksellers' 
Code: 
"The bookselling Code is not one which contains pro-
visions to prevent or restrict fair competition. 
books are published at every t ype and price; there 
are picture books from 10¢ to ~ 1.00; novels priced 
at the discretion of the publisher and always in 
competition with each other; book s of biography and 
22 
lbid., Section 3-a. 
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history in competition with lower priced reprints of 
last year's books; reference books of a new and ex-
pensive character in competition with reprints of 
good books not so lately revised, and all of these 
books are in competition with books of free access 
which every community provides ••• u23 
It is interesting to note that the one code which did 
contain a resale price maintenance agreement was adopted in 
respect to articles that were subject to severe price 
cutting and which were obviously used as loss leaders by the 
larger department outlets in New York. Agitation therefore 
stemmed mainly from the organized independent book dealers 
in that city in order to protect themselves from this type 
of competition. Whereas it has been maintained by many 
proponents of resale price maintenance that its adoption is 
needed by the manufacturer to protect his good will, and 
whereas in fact the ~upreme court of the united States 
eventually validated the r·air Trade Laws on that ground, it 
is nevertheless significant to observe that the support and 
drive for the enactment of such laws has come largely from 
the distributors. Their argument contends that it is to the 
manufacturers' interest to support such measures since without 
them the independent dealers are being eliminated with a con-
sequent curtailment of the market outlet for the producers' 
goods. In_ the long run they claim that this will work to the 
disadvantage of the consumer by causing higher prices as a 
23 
Publishers' Weekly, Oct. 20, 1934. 
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result of smaller distribution and lessened production. The 
booksellers used this line of reasoning in their propaganda 
for the inclusion of the resale price maintenance feature 
of their own code. Later, it will be interesting to note 
the similarity in the tactics used by those who fought for 
the legalization of resale price maintenance laws in the 
various states. 
More than a year after the adoption of the Booksellers' 
code Cedric Crowell, chairman of the National Booksellers' 
Code Authority, stated at a hearing in V ashington that the 
Code had been of value to the publishers, Booksellers, and 
consumers. Of 31 leading trade-book publishers 30 had shown 
an increase in sales in 1934 over those of 1933. Only one 
showed a decrease, and that of only 4%, whereas 25 of the 
24 
other 30 reported an increase of more than 10%. 
Considered objectively, however, such information re-
veals little in the way on enlightenment on the merits of 
the resale price maintenance feature of the Booksellers' code. 
Naturally sales in 1934 topped those of 1933 since it is 
evident that recovery had set in at that date. It is also 
not clear how the consumer was benefited. 
3. Post N.I.R.A.--On May 27, 1935, the Supreme Court of 
the United States held that the N.I.R.A. was unconstitutional. 
24 
Ibid., May 25,1935. 
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With this declaration the codes lost their legality. Not 
only was the Booksellers' Code with its provision on resale 
price maintenance cast into the discard, but the other codes 
containing prohibitions against below cost selling were also 
abandoned. The immediate result was a price war of gi-
gantic proportions in New York on the day following this 
court decision. Books, tobacco, liquor, and other commo-
dities were cut by department and chain stores. Macy's, 
Bloomingdale's and Gimbel's lowered their prices and even 
sent out shoppers to report the price trends in other stores. 
I n the morning Macy's book prices were 6% below published 
prices, but during the day lower and lower levels were 
25 
reached as other stores met the Macy prices. 
A clear example of predatory price cutting and the use 
of the loss leader device as an advertising medium is re-
vealed in the instance of the cigarette war in which Bloom-
ingdale's engaged. The code price for a carton of cigar-
ettes was ~pl. 20. V.rhen the N .R.A. was invalidated, Bloom-
ingdale's continued this price for a while, but eventually 
was forced to drop its prices because of the severe com-
petition of other department stores. They ended by selling 
cigarettes for 64¢ a carton and had to pay ~1.08 per carton 
for them! Of the 64¢ received , 60¢ went to the government 
for t axes, which meant that they were selling ten packages, 
25 
Ibid., June 1, 1935. 
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or 200 cigarettes, for only 4¢! bloomingdale's itself ob-
jected to this practice and tried to avoid it as long as 
possible. They argued that this system of merchandising was 
done to give the impression that all the goods in the store 
were sold at equally low prices, which they then claimed was 
26 
unfair and disastrous to small shop owners. 
·/ihatever one might think of the economic wisdom of re-
sale price maintenance, it seems difficult in the extreme 
to perceive any economic justification for this type of 
price cutting. 'l 'his is a clear case of selli:ilg far below 
the actual cost of the merchandise, and it must be evident 
that such losses must be balanced by profitable sales of 
other goods. Such selling might easily destroy the ability 
of small dealers to handle such merchandise. I t would appear 
that no relationship existed between this type of retailing 
and managerial efficiency. One result of the dissolution of 
the N. R.A. codes was the adoption by some industries of vol-
untary codes such as that of the tobacco industry whose code 
was approved by the Federal Trade Commission. Included in 
this code were the so-called fair trade provisions which 
specifically opposed the use of branded merchandise as a loss 
leader to attract trade for other goods on which the loss 
is recouped. This code also disapproved of below cost 
sales made vdth the intent and effect of in juring com-
petitors where the result tended to lessen competition, 
26 
Harvard Business 0chool, 2£· Uit. 
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27 
create a monopoly, and restrain trade. It is especially 
significent to note that although the J!'ederal 'l'rade Com-
mission has consistently objected to resale price main-
tenance as being an unfair method of competition, it did 
sanction the voluntary agreement against the use of loss 
leader selling. ~ince one of the chief objects of resale 
price maintenance is to prevent the use of this device, it 
i s difficult to understand the ~ommission 1 s attitude in 
this matter. 
Primarily, the N.R.A. codes dealt with matters per-
tinent to hours, wages, and output. lts closest approach 
to control of price cutting came through its attempt to 
prevent the sale of goods below cost. 'l.'he one exception was 
seen to be the ~ooksellers Gode with its resale price main-
tenance provision. tiut it seems evident that during this 
period, and particularly after the abandonment of the 
N.R.A., that price cutting was a serious problem and called 
for some sort of action. ~t was therefore during this era, 
and especially in the two years follovdng the Schecter 
Gase, that the greatest efforts were launched in behalf of 
..!! 'air Trade I .aws designed to legalize resale price main-
tenance which, except for t he isolated case under the N . H .A~, 
had heretofore been generally considered illegal as an un-
27 
Publishers • \~ eekly, Oct. 5, 1935. 
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fair method of competitioil. by both the Federal Trade com-
mission and the courts. 
Against a background of the general economic factors 
involved in the practice of resale price maintenance and 
after a review of the legal status of this practice, it is 
now well to turn attention to the enactment of the recent 
.t~"air 'l'rade .Laws, both state and Federal, and to examine their 
provisions, their legal history, and their economic effects. 
'l'he J',J . R .A. may properly be considered the prelude to the 
J:i 'air 'l'rade Laws. 
CHAPTER III 
THE ENACTMENT OF FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION 
III THE ENACT.MENT OF FAIR TRADE LEGISLATION 
As a result of the aetivity of organized pressure groups 
. 
a movement was started in 1931 for the adoption of laws to 
legalized the right of a manufacturer to contract for the 
resale price maintenance of his product. '!'his movement 
sprang particularly from the chaotic price situation en-
gendered by an unprecedented wave of priee cutting in the 
retail trade and gained momentum in the period immediately 
following the invalidation of the N.R.A. by the united 
States Supreme court in 1935. Although agitation for sueh 
legislation had been advanced a decade earlier, it was not 
until the depression years that this effort bore fruit. 
~xcept for the negative right of a manufacturer to refuse to 
sell his goods to one who failed to resell the product at a 
price which he approved, and except for the isolated case of 
legalized resale price maintenance in the tiooksellers' Code 
under the N.R.A., it had heretofore been generally held il-
legal for a manufacturer to make a contractual agreement in 
respect to the resale price of his merchandise. To remedy 
this situation the legislatures of most of the states 
finally adopted laws which specifically exempted contracts 
specifying the resale price of goods from inclusion in the 
group of agreements generally held to be illegal as a re-
straint of trade. The laws were destined to undergo a period 
of serious court battles; but with the s upreme Court ap-
proval in 1936, the path was opened for their more universal 
enactment, and in 1937 the era of "Fair 'l'rade " truly came 
into its own when the :teder.al Fair Trade Law was adopted as 
an amendment to the Sherman Anti-'l'rust Act. 
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A. State Fair 'l'rade Laws 
Before discussing the nature of the support and op-
position for Fair Trade Laws it will be well to present a 
brief picture of the provisions of these laws themselves. 
At present all but five of the states have adopted laws which 
permit a manufacturer to enter into a contract for the main- ' 
tenance of the resale price of his product by the distri-
1 
butor. Broadly speaking, these laws are all substantially 
similar and follow the same general pattern. Therefore, to 
gain a clearer coneeption of the essence of these laws, the 
provisions of the legislation in three states will be pre-
sented. 
1. California Law--California deserves mention in any 
analysis of li'air Trade Laws since this state was the real 
pioneer in the legalization of resale price maintenance. 'l'he 
California law went into effect on August 14, 1931, and re-
ceived its latest amendment on August 26, 193?. Included in 
the provisions of this law are the following: 
1. Definitions: Producer--a grower, maker, baker, manu-
facturer or publisher; Commodity--any su·b ject of 
commerce. 
2. land of Commodity Subject to Contract: any com-
modity the label or container of which bears the 
trade mark, brand,~r name of the producer and which 
is in competition with similar articles. 
1 
•rhe five exceptions are: Ala., Del., Missouri, vt., and 
Texas--Nelson A. Miller, "The Present Status of Fair 
'l'rade Laws", Survey of Current Business, May, 1938. 
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3. Non-Signers: are bound by a contract made between 
a producer and a dealer. 
~. Violation: is considered an unfair method of com-
petition, and actionable at the suit of the suit of 
the person damaged. 
5. ~rovisions: as between the seller and first buyer 
the contract may provide that the buyer will not 
resell at prices other than those set by the seller. 
6. Permissable Contract Provision between Seller and 
ll'irst Huyer respecting control over Resale by the 
Purchaser from the First or Subsequent Buyers: the 
contract may provide that any buyer, when he re-
sells, may secure from his customer an agreement 
to abide in any further resale by the price stipu-
lated by the first seller. 
?. Bxceptions: 1. in cases where dealer is closing out 
his stock in good faith for purposes of dis-
continuing his trade in that stock; 2. in cases of 
damaged goods where notice of such damage is given 
to the public; 3. in cases of sale under court 
order. 
8. Prohibitions: horizontal agreements between pro-
ducers, between wholesalers, or between reta ilers as 
to sale or resale prices are forbidden.2 
certain features of this law should be particularly 
noted. lt should be immediately apparent that this law is 
not mandatory. lt is not a case of state price-fixing. 'l'he 
law is rather permissive, and merely gives legal sanction to 
contracts privately executed between producers and distri-
butors relative to the resale prices of the commodities. 
A second important clause makes contracts for resale 
price maintenance binding on non-signers as well as on the 
parties to the contract. 'I1lis was not originally the case 
in the first draft of the law as enacted in 1931. At that 
2 
Printers' Ink, pp. 79-8?, Sept.,23, 193?. 
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time a separate contract was required with every retailer in 
order to force him to maintain the stipulated resale price 
of the merchandise in question. As amended in 1933, the 
law, in effect, makes all dealers in a product which has been 
placed under a price maintenance contract liable as signers 
of that contract whether or not they are actually parties 
to the agreement. Although the non-signer is not bound by 
the contract, the law provides that willfully and knowingly 
selling a commodity at less than the price stipulated in the 
contract is "unfair competition and is actionable at the suit 
of any person damaged thereby." This of course prevents a 
non-signer from disrupting a manufacturer's program and 
makes effective what othe~~ise would be a weak and inef-
fective contractual right. 
Finally it should be pointed out that this law is dis-
tinct from the so-called "Unfair Trade Practice Act" which 
was an amendment to a previous California law and which makes 
it illegal to sell any article below cost, cost to include 
raw materials, labor, and overhead; or in the c ase of dis-
tributors, it refers to the i nvoice cost plus the cost of 
doing business. This type of law is distinct from the Fair 
Trade Laws which refer to resale price maintenance. The 
distinction is at once apparent when it is seen that the 
Fair Trade Laws are permissive, merely sanctioning a private 
contractual right, whereas the other type of law is a defi-
nite attempt on the part of the state to fix prices. Such 
laws have been adopted in several states, including Mass-
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achusetts, which enacted such legislation in June, 1938. 
2. New York Law--On May 1?, 1935, just prior to the 
invalidation of the N.R.A., New York adopted "An act to pro-
tect trade mark o~~ers, distributors, and the public against 
injurious and uneconomic practices in the distribution of 
articles of standard quality under a distinguishing trade 
mark, brank, or name." This act is usually referred to as 
the Feld-Crawford Act. Its provisions are the same as those 
of the California Law, but the presentation of the exact 
text of the act may clarify the nature of these provisions. 
rrlhe wording of this l aw reads: 
Section 1. Subdivision 1. "No contract relating to the 
s ale or resale of a commodity which bears, or the label 
or content of which bears, the trade mark, brand, or 
name of the producer or owner of such commodity and 
which is in fair and open competition with commodities 
of the same general class produced by others shall be 
deemed in violation of any law of the state of New York 
by reason of any of the following provisions which may 
be contained in such contract: 
{a) "That the buyer will not resell such commodity 
except at the price stipulated by the vendor. 
(b) "That the vendee or producer require in delivery 
to whom he may resell such commodity to agree 
that he will not, in turn, resell except at the 
price stipulated by such vendor or by such 
vendee." 
Subdivision 2. "Such provisions in any contract shall 
be deemed to contain or imply conditions that such 
commodity may be resold without reference to such 
agreement in the following cases: 
(a) urn closing out the owners' stock for the pur-
pose of discontinuing delivering any such com-
modity. 
(b) nvvnen the goods are damaged or deteriorated in 
quality and notice is given to the public 
thereof. 
(c) "By any officer acting under the orders of any 
court." 
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Section 2. "Willfully and knowingly advertising, offer-
ing for sale or selling any commodity at less than the 
price stipulated in any contract entered into pursuant 
to the provisions of section one of this act, whether 
the person so advertis:i.ng, offering for sale or selling 
is or is not a party to such contract, is unfair com-
petition and is actionable at the suit of any person 
damaged thereby." 
Section 3. "This act shall not apply to any contract 
or agreement between producers, or between wholesa lers, 
or between retailers as to sale or resale prices." 
Section 4. "The following terms, as used in this act, 
are hereby defined as follows: 'Producer' means grower, 
baker, maker, manufacturer or publisher. 'Commodity' 
means any subject of commerce." 
Section 5. (refers to possibility of unconstitution-
ality.} 
3 
Section 6. "This act shall take effect immediately." 
Again it should be emphasized that this law is per-
missive, not mandatory, and that non-signers are bound as well 
as the actual signatories of contracts. It is a private 
right which is legalized, and in case of breach of contract 
the right of action is a civil right and may be brought by 
any person who is damaged as a result of a violation of the 
terms of such contract. 
Also of importance in answering the charge that this 
type of legislation destroys competition is the provision that 
only commodities· which are in fair and open competition with 
goods of the same general class produced by others are sub-
ject to price maintenance. 
I 
Publishers• Weekly, May 25, 1935. 
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3. Massachusetts ~--It is interesting to note that 
although the Massachusetts law appears after the invalidation 
of the N.H.A. and after the ~upreme court case of 1936 which 
upheld the constitutionality of .tt'air Trade .Laws, the pro-
visions are practically identical with those of the vali-
fornia and New York statutes. '!'Wo exceptions only are evi-
dent. '1'he first of these is the omission of the definition 
of the terms "producer" and 8omm.odi ty. n 
'l'he second difference refers to the exemption of certain 
sales from the stipulations in regard to the resale price of 
the commodity. As worded in the Massachusetts law this fea-
ture exempts goods sold. ''In closing out the owner's stock 
for the purpose of discontinuing delivery of any such com-
modity; provided, that such stock is first offered to the 
manufacturer of such stock at the original invoice stock price, 
at least ten days before such stock shall be offered for sale 
4. 
to the public." 
'l'he laws of the remaining forty states which have enacted 
this type of legislation are substantially similar, and fur-
ther presentation ~uuld involve needless repetition. But be-
fore analyzing the reasons for the adoption of such laws and 
reviewing their court history, a brief discussion of the 
Federal Jfair 'l'rade Law is in order. 
4 
Acts and Resolves Passed by the General Court of ~!l.ass­
-;;c1iilsetts, Chapter 398; approved May 28, 1937.-
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B. 'l'he .li'ederal .l!'air 'l'rade Law 
Despite the adoption of .li'air Trade laws in most of the 
states there still remained one serious obstacle to the com-
plete effectiveness of these laws. 'l'he difficulty lay in the 
nature of our political organization as a nation. State laws 
legally applied only to intrastate commerce; all trans-
actions involving interstate commerce still remained under the 
regulation of the ::B 'ederal government. This meant that while 
agreements relative to resale price maintenance were legal 
when applied to transactions within the boundaries of states 
which had enacted Fair Trade legislation, such agreements were 
still definitely illegal if made in interstate comrr1erce. As 
a result of this situation producers having outlets in several 
states were faced with innumerable legal diffieul ties in es:-
tablishing resale price maintenance contracts with their 
dealers. They must either incorporate in all these states, or 
establish branches in the various states. They might trust 
to the possibility that their agents in the various states 
would handle contracts for maintaining the resale price of 
their products. At best the problem was troublesome and in-
convenient. 
'rhe solution of this dilemma finally came on August 17, 
1937, when President Roosevelt signed the Miller-'I'ydings 
bill, which was passed as an &~endment to the Anti-Trust Laws 
and was attached as a rider to a District of Columbia tax 
bill. 'fhe provisions of this law read as follows: 
"Section 1 of the Act entitled 'An Act to protect trade 
and commerce against u~lawful restraints and 
--· 
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monopolies', approved ~ruly 2, 1890, is amended to read as 
follows: 
"Section 1. l£very contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade 
or commerce among the several states, or with foreign 
nation s, is hereby declared to be illegal: Provided, 
That nothing herein contained shall render illegal, 
contracts or agreements prescribing minimum prices for 
the resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or 
container of which bears, the trade mark, brand, or a 
name of the producer or distributor of such commodity 
and which is in free and open competition with com-
modities of the same general class produced or dis-
tributed by others, when contracts or agreements of 
that description are lawful as applied to intrastate 
transactions, under any statute, law, or public policy 
now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or 
the District of Columbia in which such resale is to be 
made, or to which the commodity is to be trans~orted 
for such resale, and the making of such contracts or 
agreements shall not be an unfair method of competition 
under section 5, as amended and supplemented, of the 
Act entitled, 'An Act to cre ate a Federal Trade Com-
mission, to define its Powers and duties, and for other 
purposes', approved September 26, 1914: Provided fur-
ther, That the preceding provision shall not make lawful 
any contract or agreement, providing for the establish-
ment or maintenance of minimum resale prices on any 
commodity herein involved, between manufacturers, or 
between producers, or between wholesalers, or between 
brokers, or between factors, or between retailers, or 
between persons, fi~s or corporations in competition 
with each other •••• " · 
Obviously the one feature of this law whi .ch marks it as 
an anomalous is that it does not give blanket approval to 
resale price maintenance in so f ar as interstate commerce is 
concerned, but rather merely frees from prosecution under the 
Anti-Trust Laws any agreement relative to resale price 
maintenance which is made between an interstate producer and a 
dealer in a state where suchpractice is legally recognized. 
5 
50 U.S. Stat. at L. 693 
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It would still be illegal for a producer in one state to con-
tract for the resale price of his commodity with a dealer in a 
state where such price maintenance agreements are not lav~ul, 
Since, however, the majority of states have such legislation, 
the Federal law for all practical purposes legalizes the pri-
vate contractual right of a manufacturer engaged in inter-
state commerce to make agreements with his dealers for the 
maintenance of the resale price of his goods. 
Again it should be stressed that this law, like the state 
laws which it resembles in form, is to be applied only to 
goods in free and open competition, and it is also important 
' 
to observe that horizontal agreements between manufacturers 
or distributors are also forbidden. The attempt has been 
made at least to minimize any monopolistic effects of such 
legislation. 
These, then, are the legal results of the efforts to 
establish Fair Trade. The provisions of the resale price 
maintenance laws, both state and federal, have been presented. 
It now remains to discuss the nature of the support for, and 
the opposition to, such legislation. 
C. Forces in Support of Fair Trade 
Commenting on the passage of the Feld-Crawford Act, uov-
ernor Lehman of New York remarked, 
"It seems to me to be sound economy to devise a method 
whereby a manufacturer or producer may protect himself 
against undue slashing of the price of his product, with 
the consequent destruction of the value of his trade 
mark and good will and with unnecessary loss to others. 
"Moreover, ~ believe this bill will protect the small, 
independent merchant, retailer, and business man. lt 
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should offer some protection against devastating cut 
price practices ~ch as the ruthless method of loss 
leader articles. " 
From this it becomes evident that at least two separate in-
terests are represented by the Fair 'l'rade Laws. It will be 
well therefore to examine the nature of these interests. 
1. Manufacturer Support--It has been consistently urged 
by supporters of :B'air Trade that such legislation is needed 
as a protection for the manufacturer's goodwill and reputa-
tion established by reason of years of time, effort, and money 
spent in the development of a trade marked article. The Fair 
Trade Laws were finally upheld in the Supreme Court mainly on 
the basis of a manufacturer's property rights represented by 
his label. Even the distributors who have advocated legali-
zation of resale price maintenance have advanced this argu-
ment. The economic significance of this factor was analyzed 
in an earlier chapter, but here it is desirable to learn 
whether this argument has really been seriously urged by 
manufacturers themselves, and to learn further the true · atti-
tude of manufacturers toward this type of "protectionn. 
In its Report ~ Resale Price Maintenance the Federal 
Trade Commission offers the following interesting results of 
its survey of 691 manufacturers: "It is significant to note 
that, so far as the results for these 691 manufacturers are 
indicative, the strongest sentiment for resale price main-
tenance is not to be found either among those v.ho showed 
6 
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losses or among smaller concerns for whose protection it is 
strongly urged by some of its proponentsn . In support of this 
contention, the Commission submits the following table which 
indicates the investment and sales position of both the pro-
ponents and opponents of Fair Trade Laws: 
7 
Group No. of Cos. Av. Invest. Av. Sales 
:Favor 199 3, 263, 143 5, 933, 534 
Opposed 66 1, 524, 669 2, 575, 801 
Indifferent 426 3, 535, 094 5, 111, 591 
and 
No Reply 
From this the Commission reasons that if manufacturers 
V~rere honestly interested in good will protection, the results 
should have been reversed. Tha t is, the smaller companies 
both as to sales and investments, in whose interest Fair Trade 
Laws are advocated, should logically have been favorable to 
such legislation. It further argues that these results show 
the manufacturer-advocates of resale price maintenance are the 
relatively larger and more successful companies whose interest 
is the protection of substantial profits. This is supposedly 
substantiated by the fact that for eight of t we lve industry 
groups classified, the rate of earnings of those favorable to 
such laws were, on the average, appreciably higher than those 
definitely opposed or indifferent .8 
It might, however, be suggested that these results show 
7 
:F' . T. C. Op. Cit., p . 19. 
8 
Ibid • , p • 18 . 
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that manufacturers were interested in the maintenance of 
their good will, for it seems logical to presume that it would 
be the l a rger and more successful companies which had es-
tablished a property right in their product and wanted to 
protect that right. Smaller concerns, in contrast, possibly 
had not developed the consumer recognition of their com-
modities and hence had no interest in a law that would aid 
their larger competitors. Accurate conclusion on this point, 
however, is obviously impossible from the nature of the data 
available. 
One other fact, however, might lend support to the 
Commission's attitude. It seems odd that a group in whose 
interest Fair Trade Laws were advocated showed such little 
active interest in promulgating these laws. Organized manu-
facturer-support seems conspicuously absent. This lends some 
weight to the opinion that the real support for Fair Trade 
stemmed from a different source, and that the argument for 
good will protection was more of a rationalization than a real 
r eason for the adoption of price-maintenance legislation. 
2. Distributor Sup~ort--Indeed the true support for Fair 
Trade originated mainly from distributors. The real pressure 
for such laws has been consistently a distributor-pressure. 
And in this group the strongest force in the movement has been 
the National Association of Retail Druggists, which in three 
-
years achieved a record of accomplishments almost unmatched 
g 
by any other national pressure group . 
9 
Business ~'eek, Aug. 28, 1937. 
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Some of the other commercial fields closely identified with 
the movement include electric appliance and radio dealers, 
retail jewelers, retail tobacco dealers, retail booksellers, 
retail automobile dealers, retail liquor dealers, and to some 
10 
extent retail grocers. 
'l'he economic arguments raised by distributors who favor 
resale price maintenance have been treated in a previous 
chapter, but their argument which maintains that price main-
tenance is necessary to prevent the elimination of the in-
dependent dealer which would cause a curtailed market and 
result in higher prices and a decreased production, should be 
recalled when examining the nature of the dealer support. The 
f eet that the strongest agitation for Fair Trade has come 
from distributors r a ther than from manufacturers seems to lend 
some credence to the opinion that the intent of these laws is 
to protect dealers rather than manufacturers. 
Some interesting results vrere revealed by the Federal 
Trc. de Commission several years prior to the wave of Fair 
Traa.e successes relative to the type of dea lers who advocated 
resale price maintenance. In brief, its survey indicated tha t 
among the dealers questioned it was the smaller concerns which 
favored price maintenance, ~hile the larger chains and depart-
ment stores were opposed. This was particularly true of the 
10 
Nelson Miller, QE.. Cit. 
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drugs and grocery stores. Out of 268 companies considered, 
239 favored resale price maintenance; and of these the 
average investment per enterprise in 1929 was $ 55, 755. In 
the opposing group, the 21 companies reported an average 
11 
business investment of ~76, 521 per enterprise. 
This situation is exactly the reverse of that found in 
the case of the manufacturers. Perhaps these results indicate 
a correlation between the forces supporting this type of 
legislation. In other words, support for resale price main-
tenance comes in each instance from those whose own special 
interests were at stake. Whereas the producers were inter-
ested in maintaining their profits, the distributors seem 
equally anxious to secure legal protection against the 
aggressive competition of those forces which threaten their 
very existence. 
Although the Commission's report was made several years 
before the recent .ft' air ·rrade successes, it is ihteresting to 
note that these same interests were aligned in the same way 
in later years. 'l'he Commission argued that the reason for 
the support of the drug trade for Fair ~rade lay in their 
anticipation of larger profits. 
One peculiar paradox is found in the support of the chain 
Drug s tore Association. 'I'he reason for this support, which 
runs counter to the usual trend among chain stores, is ex-
plained by one wr.iter who contends that as a result of 
------
11 
li' . '1' . c. 2.E.. cit. , pp. 82 ' 83. 
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e arlier price~cutting t actics thi s cha in group ha d es-
t ablished a firm pos ition in the tra de, and no longer nee ding 
the aggres s ive price policy by which they had built their 
business, now desired legisl ation to protect them from the 
competition of others who were making inroa ds on the ir bus i-
ness by the s ame price strategy t hey t hemselves had origi-
12 
nally employed. 
Also of possible significance, and a factor whi ch calls 
for serious examination, is the fact that most of the dis-
tributor support comes from specialty dealers in luxury or 
semi-luxury products. Books, j ewelry, r adio s , liquor, drugs, 
and cosmetics are leaders in this classification. When sub-
jected to the competition of chains and departments which can 
aff ord to use these items as adver tising media and recoup 
losses in other departments eith er by higher mark- up s or by 
virtue of gre ater volume, t he s e indeuendent dealers find 
exi s tence itself di fficult. 'l'he question might well be r aised 
of t he economic jus tification of such specialty selling. Is 
it justifiabl~? Such a question requires more investi-
gation than is here possible, but one point should be men-
tioned. If the larger outlets can sell thes e items at lower 
prices by reason of gre ater efficiency , and do not recoup 
loss e s by exhorbitant mark-ups on -other merchandise wit h the 
consequent deception to cus t omers, it s eems questionable to 
12 
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permit the less efficient dealers to survive at the expense 
of the consuming public. I f, however, the loss leaders are 
used merely as advertising, and loss es are regainea. through 
extravagant mark-ups on uni dentifiable merchandise, it vrould 
seem that such selling was at least open to question as being 
economically desirable; and legislation designed to prevent 
tha t type of distribution would appear in a more favorable 
light. 
Rowever, it can at least be determined that support for 
resa le price maintenance has been derived largely from dis-
tributors, a nd that of this group the strongest advocates have 
been the independent dealers. Whether their economlc 
reasoning is sound is i mpossible to judge from the inadequate 
data available. 
D. Forces Opposed to Fair Trade 
Chief among the objectors to Fair rl'rade have been the 
13 
large-scale distributors. These include the chains, large 
department stores, and mail order houses. As was pointed out 
e arlier, it has been the concerns making the l arger profits 
and having the larger investments at stake that have been 
most vociferous in their op~osition . Among the leaders in the 
department s tore group was Macy's, of New York, which in the 
spring of 1935 when the Feld-Cr awford bill was under con-
13 
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sideration, published a series of large advertisements in 
editorial and graphic style in the leading New York papers 
attacking all attempts to :force price maintenance on the 
retail stores. lt :purported to champion the cause of the 
14 
consumer. 'Jlhe economic arguments of these groups have been 
discuss ed in the first chapter. It has naturally been their 
policy to oppose the enactment of legislation which was de-
signed to prevent the continuance of the price policy upon 
which their main consumer appeal had been established •. 
The outstanding argument advanced by these forces was 
that such legislation placed a premium on inefficient op-
eration and reacted to the disadvantage of the consumer. Even 
after the enactment of the New York Fair Trade Law, Macy's 
continued its campaign against this statute and tried to 
capitalize on it by inserting advertisements ,~.nich promoted 
their ovm private brands. rl'hey used the slogan "The con-
sumer will now decide", and attempted to show that as a re-
sult of this law prices on trade-marked goods had risen, 
~.rhereas Macy' s own brands were sold below the price-main-
tained merchandise. The bulk of the criticism was directed 
15 
at drug and cosmetic items • 
..t£:x:amination of the available material has failed to 
re~eal any active manufactuPer opposition to the laws, 
14 
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15 
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and the apparently complete apathy of this element in whose 
. 
interests Fair Trade has been urged is perhaps indicative 
of the ture nature of resale price maintenance legislation. 
I t emphasizes the fact that the movement has been largely 
a distributor-pressure, designed to prevent the elimination 
and the declining profits of the independent dealers who 
were finding the severe price competition of the large and 
powerful outlets too strong. 
The Federal Trade Commission, which presumably repre-
sents the opinion and interests of the consuming public, 
was vehement in its opposition to the enactment of the 
Federal Fair Trade Law. The Commission claims that the law 
would be harmful to the consumer since the effect of such 
a statute would be to raise prices at a time of normally 
advancing prices. On this subject the Commission reported 
to the President in 1937 that "There is a great possi-
bility that manufacturers and dealers may abuse the power 
to arbitrarily fix resaie prices by unduly increasing prices, 
resulting in bitter resentment on the part of the consuniing 
16 
public, especially in this period of rising prices." 
And in reliance on this report the President himself origi-
nally urged the defeat of this measure. 
These then are the outstanding opponents of Fair Trade, 
16 
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and since the economic reasons for their stand have been pre-
sented in a previous chapter, there is no need to repeat those 
arguments here. But before attempting to give some data on 
the results of these laws, a brief review of the legal his-
tory of Fair Trade is in order. 
E. The Courts and Fair Trade Laws 
It would have been naive to suppose that the enactment 
of Fair Trade Laws would go unchallenged by those whose inter-
ests were immediately affected. Perhaps the clearest test of 
these laws came in New York when Doubleday, Doran, publishers, 
applied for an in.1unction against Macy to prevent that store 
from selling books below the prices stipulated in contracts 
with the booksellers. Macy decided ·to fight the case as a 
test of the constitutionality of the Feld-Crawford Act. 
The original injunction was denied by Judge Close in the lower 
court, and the case was immediately appealed to the New York 
Court of Appeals, highest court in the state. 
1. First New York Ruling--In presenting its defense, 
attorney Lauerstein, representing Maey, argued that the Act 
was unconstitutional for the following reasons: 
1. The bill permits private price-fixing, since it gives 
the manufacturer the power to set the price at which 
another person must sell his o~~ property. In the 
absence of public control, the private manufacturer 
obta ins an absolute price-fixing right. 
2. It does not require a uniform price. 
3. It does not require the contract to be in writing. 
4. It does not prohibit sales below cost. 
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5. I t does not prohibit price cutting with the intention 
of injuring or destroyi ng a competitor. 
6. ~t is not an emergency measure. 
7. I t eliminates retail competition, the very point where 
it should ope rate, since one-half the cost of mer-
chandise is often found in retail distribution. 
8 • ..!finally, it is unconstitutional as a violation of the 
due process clause of the 14th amendment, since under 
section 2 retailers are deprived of liberty and pro-
perty without due process of law, because the leg-
islature is without power to enact a general price-
fixing l aw applicable to all commodities and all bus-
inesses, and because the statute is arbitrary, dis-
criminatory, a nd invalid to any legislative pur-
pose.l7 
'l 'he arguments advanced by Doubleday, Doran expressed the 
following considerations: 1. the principle of price-
maintenance has already been recognized and approved by the 
New York Court; 2. the effect of the act is to give full pro-
tection to a legitimate business interest which has long been 
recognized but inadequately protected; 3. the Act does not 
prescribe price-fixing by government agencies; 4. the bill 
does not sanction horizonta l price-fixing; 5. the exceptions 
provided in the Act eliminate any charge of unreasonableness. 
'l 'he real point at issue, however, was section 2 of the 
Act, in which is found the non-signer clause making the price 
set in any contract binding on non-signers as well as signa-
tories to the contract. ~t was argued that this clause gave a 
remedy against those who sell for less than the stipulated 
17 
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price, and thus afforded the small manufacturer the same op-
portuni ty already accruing to l a rge companies ·which were able 
to establish uniform prices by means of the agency device. 
It was further contended that section 2 was adopted in 
recognition of the undesirable results of predatory price-
cutting, which is an unfair method of competition, and that 
this section merely gave a right of action to the O\vner or 
producer of a trade-marked or branded article who could show 
that 1. he had a price contract outstanding; 2. that the de-
fendant knowingly sold below the established price; so that, 
3. damage resulted to the mvner or producer or other party 
18 
affected. 
The New York Court of Appeals on January?, 1936, rendered 
its decision in favor of the defendant, and for more than a 
ye a r the law was ineffective as being unconstitutional. While 
it was only section 2 of the Act that was rejected as a 
violation of the 14th amendment of the F.'ederal Constitution, 
the law was practically useless without the inclusion of the 
non-signer clause. 
2 . Supreme Court Decision--In December, 1936, the Su-
preme Court of the United States unanimously upheld the 
18 
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constitutionality of the Fair 'I'rade .Laws of California and 
19 
~llinois. I n its decision the Court drew a distinction be-
tween the right of the dealer in the commodity bought for 
resale and his right in the good will of the manufacturer as 
represented by the trade mark of brand on the merchandise. 
~fuile the distributor could sell the commodity as such at 
whatever price he chose, whenever he sold it together with 
the trade mark or identification of the manufacturer he 
must adhere to the price established in the contract. Good 
will was recognized as a property right worthy of pro-
tection. The Court further alluded to the idea that com-
petition was still possible among producers of identified 
merchandise. 
In other words, the Court s aw no ground on which to 
declare these laws unconstitutional. It recognized the right 
of the state legislature, acting as a reasonable body, to 
pass statutes it felt necessary to remedy conditions which it 
believed to be evil and detrimental. In view of the pro-
visions of the laws it is not difficult to accept this de-
cision. It is noteworthy, however, that the whole basis of 
19 
The California case involved Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales 
Co., and Kunsman v. Factor and Co.; the I llinois case 
involved the Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Sea-
gram Distillers Corp., -- Dec. ?, 1936. From The 
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their constitutionality was predicated on a conception of a 
property right accruing to the manufacturer. This is sig-
nificant in light of the fact that these laws were instituted 
largely at the instance of distributors, not manufacturers, 
and it will be seen to be even more important when con-
sideration is given to the results of Fair Trade Laws. The 
immediately important point, however, is that as the laws 
were constituted they contained nothing that would render 
them unconstitutional. 
3. New York Reversal--This ruling of the Supreme Court 
injected new life into the cause of Fair Trade. On March 9, 
1937, the New York Court of Appeals in the case of the Bour-
jois Sales Co., Inc. vs. Abraham Darfman reversed itself in 
20 
an opinion handed dov'vn by Justice Crane. Since the Illinois 
and California laws were similar to that of New York, the 
court felt bound to reverse its previous decision in which 
it had held the Feld-Crawford Act unconstitutional • 
.in the absence of a Federal J.!'air •rrade Law manufacturers 
did not immediately follow with contracts as a result of the 
21 
Supreme Court opinion. eut this decision did. have an im-
mediate and decided effect on :F'air Trade Laws. Within three 
months, eighteen more states passed .lrair 'l'rade laws, and in 
the second quarter of 1937 eight more were added. When in 
20 
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August, 1937, New Hampshire enacted such a law, the total for 
22 
1937 reached 27. 
by 1937 Fair Trade Laws had become unquestionably legal, 
and their a doption by the states had become almost universal. 
These were supplemented by the Federal Fair Trade Law, and 
the era of legalized resale urice ma intenance at last had 
arrived. I t now remains to point out some of the results 
that have accrued from such legislation. A modest effort 
to do this will be made within the limitations of greatly 
inadequate statistical data. · 
22 
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CHAPTER IV 
COMPETITION U1~ER FAIR TRADE 
rv. COMP ETITION UNDER FAIR TRADE 
'When the effort was made earlier to appraise the eco-
nomic significance of resale price maintenance, accurate 
conclusions were i mpossible from the inadequate statistical 
data available. oimilarly, a fair analysis of the results 
of the operation of the :F'air Trade Laws is necessarily sub-
ject to the s ame limitations. 'l1hese l aws have not been in 
effect long enough to reveal their true influence on the com-
petitive factor in our economy, and the conflicting testi-
mony presented by various pressure groups makes an objective 
appraisal difficult in the extreme. 
No further attempt can be made at this stage to deter-
mine the influence of resale price maintenance itself on 
distributor or producer competition. \"lhat remains is the 
necessity of investigating the effect of resale price main-
tenance as applied under the particular laws which have given 
sanction to this practice. ~n this connection, certain fac t s, 
while not conclusive, are at least suggestive of possible 
trends. 
A. Nature and ~xtent of Fair Trade Contracts 
tiefore considering the results of the operation of these 
laws a brief presentation of the extent to which manufacturers 
have availed themselves of the opportunities of legalized re-
sale price maintenance and of the type of products included 
in these contracts will be helpful and suggestive. Since 
contra cts have been executed in 43 states, no one source is 
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available which gives complete data on this question. How-
ever, several different sources reveal information on this 
problem. I n its catalog for the fall and winter of 193?-38, 
s ears, Roebuck, and Co., lists the following items as those 
1 
whose resale prices has been "fixed by law": 
Pebeco, I pana, Wildroot Products, Lucky Ti ger Hair 
Tonic, and Hair Dress, "¥ itches' .Hair ~onic, Vitalis, 
Gem Blades, l:!;ver-Ready Bl ades, I ngram '3having c ream, 
:r,~enen Pro ducts, vvoodbury Products, Hind's Products, 
J ergens Lotion, Sal Hepatica, Vicks Vapor .Hub, etc. 
Business Week reports that about 5000 contracts were in 
effect in New York by Nov. 15, 193?. These included the fol-
2 
lowing types of products: 
Artists' bupplies 
Babie s ' Art i cles 
Hooks 
CaJ;Iiera Supplies 
Tobacco pro duct s 
Clock s 
cosmet i cs jJrugs 
~lectrical Goo ds 
u-arnes 
u-roceries 
Liquors 
Luggage 
Notions 
Novelty Jewelry 
Radios 
Smolcing Accessories 
Stationery 
?0 
5 
1261 
50 
53 
11 
1580 
8 50 
6 
2 
2 
360 
9 
? 
53 
?5 
30 
20 
I n the Hardware field, resale price maintenance con-
tracts have been executed in all 43 states, of which Ca li-
fornia has the largest number, 3?, (VI.rhich may be sign i -
fic ant since this state · has operated under Fair ·:trade Laws 
1 
Printers• I nk, Aug. 12, 193?. 
2 
:N ov. 27, 193?. 
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3 
longer than any other), New York 24, and I '~assachusetts 20. 
The book trade has long been active in impressing for 
the adoption of J:i'air 'l'rade ]::.,aws, and in October, 1935, the 
neritage J:>ress became the first publisher to take advantage 
4 
of the new law. Three weeks later three more publishers 
signed contracts under the l!'eld-crawford Act, and by July, 
193?, 32 publishers were operating under legalized resale 
5 
price maintenance contracts. 
1. Types of Products--From the results cited, it is ap-
parent that the greatest number of res ale price maintenance 
contracts occur in products of a luxury , or semi-luxury na-
ture. This in itself may be significant. Furthermore, these 
contracts are largely confined to products that are notable 
for their established consumer preferences built as a result 
of intensive advertising which has served to identify these 
goods in the minds of the consumers. To be subject to this 
type of contract commodities must be branded or labelled, but 
it is noteworthy that the greatest adoption of contracts has 
occurred on goods whose identification has become firmly 
established. 
Of these cornnodities cited, four are outstanding in 
their conformity to a fixed resale price. Books, liquor, 
3 
Hardware Retailer, Dec., 1938. 
4 
Publishers' 1Xeekly, Oct. 19, 1935. 
5 
Ibid., July 31, 193?. 
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drugs, an d cosmetics far outnumber any other products in this 
class. 'l'his is i mportant, for it was on these very items that 
retail price cutting was most severe prior to the adoption of 
Fair 'l'rade, and three of these commodities are handled by 
drug stores, whose support of F'air 'l'rade was notorious·. 
Conspicuously limited are the contracts in the more staple 
lines such as groceries. While such grocery products as 
Mayonnaise, etc., have been subjected to this type of price 
control, f ood producers in general have been hesitant about 
issuing resale price maintenance contracts. 'l'his is partly 
a result of the dominant position of the corporate and vol-
untary chains i n the distribution of food. 0ince the chains 
control about ?5~ of the sales of many grocery products, 
their attitude is i mportant; and should they be dissatisfied 
with the established price level or profit margin, they ~uuld 
be in a position to retaliate with private brands more 
6 
easily than could the drug cha i ns . 'I'he problem of brands 
will be separ ately considered, but it i s necessar y to mention 
this limiting factor on the adoption of price contracts . Gro-
cery outlets in general have avoided resale price maintenance 
contracts, even though bothered with destructive price cut-
ting, and have preferred t o seek their relief through the new 
"Unfair Practice Act" which is being adopted in many states 
6 
Husiness Week , April 24, 193?. 
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and which prevents the sale of goods below cost plus a mark-
7 
up to cover overhead. ;l.'his is natural when it is recalled 
that such a law automatically controls all retail outlets, 
on all products, and hence price cutting can be checked with-
out incurring the competition of private brands. 
H. National Versus Private Hrands 
National brands is the term usually applied to the 
labelled, trade-marked, or identified product of a producer; 
private brands, by contrast, refer to the products sold under 
the name of large distributors, either large chains, depart-
ment, mail order houses, or wholesale establishments, and 
which bear the identification of the distributor. 'rhese 
letter generally cover a sma ller geographical area, although 
that area may be large. These two types of goods are in 
active competition, and it was one of the chief arguments of 
Fair Trade sponsers that private brands were substituted for 
national brands after customers had been lured into the store 
as a result of the attractively reduced price on national-
brand goods. 
The extent of the use private brands veries with dif-
ferent lines of goods, being greater in such commodities as 
hardware, foods, and dry goods, and less in tobacco and 
propriatary remedies where more importance is attached to a 
7 
Nelson Miller, QE. Cit. 
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manufacturer's trade mark or brand. Private brands are 
often preferred by distributors, since they usually bring 
higher margins of profit. This is supported by the data 
gathered by the Feder al Trade Commission, prior to the 
ado pt i on of Fair Tr a de Laws. The Commission reported that 
in the drug , hardvrare, grocery, and dry goods l i nes, both 
independents and department stores paid higher prices for 
nationally advertised goo ds than for competing private 
brands, and also sold them at higher prices; but both re-
ceived a larger percentage margin on the competing arti-
8 
cles. The same was true, the Commissions continues, in the 
case of the drug and grocery chains. Statistical data on 
the sub j ect reveals that on sales of 53 items of national 
brands, the average gross margin was 30.6%, a mark-up of 44% 
on cost. In the case of competing items the average gross 
margin was 47.9%, a mark-up of 91.8% on cost. These figures 
represent prices taken from independent, chain drug, and 
9 
department stores. 
The t wo i mportant observations necessary in this con-
nection are first, that priva te brands are generally more 
lucrative to the merchant, · and second, that they apply better 
to stap le lines like ha r dware, dry goods, and groceries. 
The Fair Trade l aws specifically limit themselves to 
8 
F. T. C. Q£. Cit., pp . 123-124 
9 
I bid ., pp . 99-100 
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goods which are labelled, trade-marked, or identified, and 
which are in fair and. open competition wi th other goods of 
the same general class. Some have advanced the argument 
tha t the mere process of branding an article removes it 
i mmediately from competition, and puts it into a monopolis-
tic position. How, they argue, can a product that is de-
manded by name, be in competition with other goods? 1Nhile 
there is doubtless some theoretical ground for this con-
tention, such an argument overlooks two important factors. 
:First, such goods are always in competition with other goods, 
even t hough branded, since there is the natural competition 
of conflicting desires. And secondly, such an argument over-
l ooks the presence of private brands, which are fre quently 
sub s tituted at the point of s ale, and which often have used 
the advertising value of national brands to attract trade to 
which they then sell the pri~ate and more productive brands. 
Theoretically Fair Trade Laws were enacted to protect 
the reputation and good will of the manufacturer of labelled 
and branded goods who suffered at the hands of predatory re-
t a il price cuttihg . The wording of the l aws apparently had 
this end in mind. Yet, cur iously, the laws are thought by 
some to be a boomerang, destructive of the very purpose for 
which they were supposedly passed. This anomalous situa tion 
grew out of the tendency for chains and department s to re-
pl a ce national brands with private brands. And t h i s effect, 
while in ,jurious t o the producer, also hurt the small retai ler 
who in re ality supported Fair Trade Laws more actively than 
the producers and ·who beli-eved they had at l a st f ound 
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security from the evils of price cutting. oince the chains 
ana. departments could reta lia te with t heir ovm brands, the 
smaller retailers who lacke d the resources for this type of 
merchandi s i ng , once again were the victims of price cut-
10 
ting. 
Another development apparently discounted by the early 
:porponents of Fair 'L'r a de Laws is the hes i tation of some 
manufacturers to issue resale price maintenan ce contracts 
out of fear t hat the cha ins, which control about 25% of the 
retail busi ness, will retaliate ~ath an active development of 
11 
private brands. l\1anufacturers, in reality, have faced a 
dilemma . If they meet the price demands of the independents 
they automatically invite the increased competition of pri-
vate brands from chains, mail order houses, and department 
stores; if they fail to ~lease the i ndependents, they will 
suffer the rui nous reta liation of non-coo per ation and sub-
12 
stitution. 1n addition to the strong organization in the 
drug trade, this dilemma on the part of the manufacturers may 
account for the larger use of resale price maintenance con-
tra cts in the lines ·l e ast subject t o the influence of pri-
vate brands. 
William lngersoll, propagandist for .F'air 'l'r a de Laws, 
10 
0aul Nelson, Op. Cit., (Aug . 1 93? ) . 
11 
Charles Ph ilips , Survey Uraphic, March, 1938 . 
1 2 
Bu siness Week, July 20, 1935. 
-119-
asks the interesting but naive question, c an ·the chains con-
tinue to grow without the use of the loss leaderY lt will, 
he adds, be expensive for the chains to push their own 
13 
brands without the attra ction of leaders. undoubtedly the 
chains and departments have em}~ loyed the loss leader in 
order to promote their private brands, and the cost of a 
part of the advertising of national brands ought logically 
to be applied to the private brands in determining their real 
cost to the com_rnuni ty. .However, :F'air Trade Laws offered an 
unforseen avenue for the promotion of private brands. Mail 
order houses and large department stores attempted to capi-
talize on these laws. 
1viontgomery 1Nard, for example, advertised in their 
catalogs tha t as a result of Fair Tracte Laws prices had risen, 
and that _customers could get better quality, equivalent mer-
chan dise, if they bought Ward's private brands. They not 
only opposed nationally advertised goods subject to resale 
price maintenance contract s , but i mpliedly condemned all 
national brands. One of their advertisements read, ''Save 
money. Huy a \•\' ard product. ;:;.:ee P. ?". ln another ad-
vertisement they said that \'l ard formerly sold a well-l<:nown 
brand of aspirin for 49¢, but now as a result of Fair Trade 
Laws, t h ey were forced to sell it for 59¢. They continued, 
13 
V'dlliarn Ingersoll, "No Private Brand Paradise", 
Printers ' lnk, J an . 21, 193?. 
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ho"~Never, tha t the consumer need not suffer, but instead 
might buy 'Nard's aspirin for only 19¢ and save ~0¢ over the 
old price. oears, Roebuck, and co. adopted similar tactics, 
14 
but more intensively. .Ln the department store group, NJ.acy' s 
pioneered with large advertisements in the papers which 
claimed that !!Price fixing means price raising " , and cited 
figures to indicate how prices on nationally advertised goods 
had risen as a result of the Feld-Crawford Act. They ad-
vanced their own brands, and placed them beside price-raised 
15 
goods for comparison. 
'J'o those who feared that the adoption of Fair '.l'rade 
Laws would eliminate competition in the retail trade, the 
hi story of the use of private brands and the ingenuity with 
which the opponents of these laws turned them to their own 
advantage, must afford some comfort. To the small dealers, 
such perversion of these laws must indeed appear ironical. 
but the fact that contracts for resale price maintenance 
have been l argely confined to four luxury lines is perhaps 
even more significant. 
C. The Threat to Producer Competition 
In his l amentation on the wide adoption of the Fair 
Trade Laws, Saul Nelson, writing in Harpers, points out that 
14 
~rinters' I nk, Aug. 12, 1937. 
15 
Harvard Business ochool, QE. Cit., exhibit 6. 
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these laws give to the manufacturer an enormous economic 
power and wide license to raise prices, since they provide no 
check on the producer's free d i scretion. All this is pos-
sible despite the i mplicit faith of proponents that com-
petition among rival manufacturers will impose an automatic 
16 
check on undue price rises. 
Several interesting features in connection with this 
question immediately present themselves. It was seen earlier 
that one check on higher prices is found in the producers' 
fear of retaliation by means of private brands. This fear 
has deterred many manufacturers from even issuing resale 
price maintenance contracts, and no doubt has contributed 
even more to restraining the resale price in cases where con-
tracts have been executed. A further check arises out of 
ahticipated consumer resi s tance, which is really a cor-
relative reason, since diss atisfied nurchasers naturally 
would turn t o the private brands. 
but aside from these checks, it was assumed that 
rivalry among producers would certainly prevent their exact-
ing exhorbitant resale prices. This was supposedly pro-
vided for in the laws themselves, since legally only those 
goods ·wJ1ich are in fair and open competition with other goods 
of the same general line are eligible for contractual resale 
prices. And to guard agains~ any possib i lity of a gentleman's 
16 
Aug., 193?. 
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agreement among producers, these laws all specifically pro-
hibit horizonta l price fixing as between retailers, producers, 
or wholesalers. 
A situation has arisen under the Pair Trade Laws, how-
ever, which effectively nullifies the competitive factor in 
regulating the contractual resale price of commodities. 
Throughout it has been apparent that the real interest in 
these laws originated not with the manufacturers, but with 
the distributors. 'rhis was particularly true in those lines 
that were subject to severe price cutting, namely the drug, 
liquor, book, and cosmetic merchandise. Most active of all, 
perhaps, were the retail druggists who through their local 
and national associations were mainly responsible for the 
enactment of Fair Trade Legislation. 
Strong retail groups, particularly the drug interests, 
have not allowed their influence to lapse with the passage 
of Fair 'l'rade Lav.rs . By co-operating closely, they have 
caused a reversal of the initial fear of this type of legis-
lation. Instead of permitting a manufacturer to exact ex-
horbitant prices, these l aws, unwittingly to some, have fos-
tered the danger of dealer-dictated prices. By their in-
sistance on large margins, retaile r s have been able to force 
manufacturers into contracts which often they would prefer to 
avoid. l.'·.'hat has happened is that ins tead of s afe guarding 
the good will of the producer by sanctioning vertical price 
maintenance, J:; 'air Trade has turned inevitably into 
horizontal price fixing which has tende d to make competitive 
-1.23-
17 
goods reach a corrunon and usually higher price level. Such 
dictation effectively eliminates the automatic price check 
of producer '. competition. 
Factually, independent retail drugr ists have insisted 
on a margin of 33 .33% of the retail price, and according to 
Drug rl'opics, 46.1% of the independents voted for a mark-up 
18 
of from 28% to 50%. The demand for a 33.33% margin means a 
gross profit of 50% of invoice cost, whereas the average 
cost of drug store operation is 27%, with many capable of 
operating at even less. When it is remembered that resale 
price maintenance applies to trade-marked goods whose cost 
of selling is lower because of a greater turnover, the 
necessary margin is still lower. Chains and departments 
cannot lower prices, and hence they receive exhorbitant pro-
19 
fits with the consumer absorbing the loss. 
The strength of these retail pressure groups is in-
dic ated from the experience of the Pepsodent Company in the 
earlier stages of Fair Trade development. The force of the 
retail tr ::1 de in compelling manufacturers even against their 
wishes is clearly revealed in this case. Pepsodent at first 
maintained its prices under the California :B'air Trade l aw. 
Deciding, however, after a trial, to revert to its old policy, 
the company cancelled its resale price maintenance contra cts. 
17 
Business Vieek, Aug. 28, 1937. 
18 
Ibi d., July 20, 1935; Saul Nelson, Op. Cit. 
19--
Nelson, .2:£.. Cit. 
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Immediately, every California drug store shelved Pepsodent 
products and pushed brands which had incurred their favor 
as a result of price-maintenance at a satisfactory margin. 
'l'he reprisal was not confined to California, but spread 
throughout the country to such an extent that the Pepsodent 
Company was losing sales to its rival, I pana, despite in-
tense national advertising. So effective was the boycott 
that the Pepsodent Company not only returned to its price-
maintenance policy, but even sent the druggists a check for 
20 
~? 25, 000 to aid them in their fight for Fair Trade! 
Dealer control is exercised mainly through the so-ca lled 
Fair Trade Committees of retail trade associations. These 
coramittees theoretically exist to aid in the execution of 
legally s atisfactory resale price maintena nce contracts, and 
manufacturers are urged to consult these committees before 
drawing up their contracts. Actually such "approval" as 
these a gencies give i s really a dictation of the terms of the 
contract and serves to nullify the prohibitions as to hori-
zontal price fixing. Most active of these committees are 
those in the drug trade, which has not only state but even 
national control. The National Association of Retail Drug-
gists at one time adopted a 12-point program in conjunction 
with state associa tions and Fair 'l'rade Committees. This was 
20 
~usiness ~eek, Aug. 28, 1937. 
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l a ter abandoned in fear of violation of the Sherman Act and 
threatened prosecution by the E'ederal ;1·rade Commission. 
Originally they ha d wanted to dictate prices by napproving as 
to form" all l!'air Trade vontracts issued by manufacturers, 
but this was modifie d to limit their activities to those of 
an advisory nature. lf'inally even this plan was abandoned. 
Yet the control still persists in the existence of the otate 
21 
li'air Trade agencies. 
0ome of the effect of this control is interestingly re-
vealed by the director of one of the large national retail 
trade as soci ation s which has been opposed to :Fair ;rrade 
Legislation. .i:ie V'.rrit e s, "The J:t'air Trade laws have been taken 
up to a great extent by manufacturers, some i n my opi nion 
because they really believed that it was a proper p r otection 
for their goo d will; others because they were high - .jacked into 
it by associations of retailers who were anxious to i n sure 
t heir receipt of a mark-up which ·could not be obtained under 
22 
compet i tive conditions. " 
It thus becomes evi dent that legalized re sale price 
maintenance has produced a situation which while it may not 
be the only influence on re s ale prices, at least is sug-
ge s tive of the dangers inherent i n thi s t yp e of legislation. 
Ostensibly desi gne d t o pr ot._e_ct manufa cturers, these laws 
21 
Ibid ., Oct. 9, 193?. 
22 
Private Correspondence, January, 1939. 
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were largely instigated by dealers interested in their own 
preservation in face of severe competition. Despite apparent 
safeguards against monopolistic price-fixing, powerful re-
tail trade associations have to some extent nullified these 
provisions. Therefore, even in the absence of manufacturer 
desire to impose exhorbitant prices, it has resulted that 
they h ave often been unwillingly forced into price con-
tracts which permit retailers unnecessarily high margins with 
consequently higher burdens on consumers. ln theory l!'air 
Trade might not have been an enemy of competition, but cer-
tainly in practice there many indications that it has tended 
to defeat the regulative functioning of an automatic economy. 
D. Prices Under Fair Trade 
Unfortunately any valid conclusion on the affects of 
Fair r rade Laws on prices is impossible in the absence of re-
liable and adequate statistical data. Surveys and reports 
have been made purporting to show that prices have been raised 
as a result of this legislation, and equally vociferous re-
plies have eminated from investigations conducted by those 
whose interest lay in revealing the opposite conclusion. 
~ven assuming honesty on the part of those who have made 
studies, viTong conclusions are innocently possible. ln his 
article in The Survey of Current Business, Nelson Ivliller 
co~nents on the difficulties of price research in this 
field: 
"Sound research into the effect of Fair 'l'rade Laws 
on prices is beset with real difficulties. It is one 
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thing to determine a change in price, and quite another 
thing to isolate the cause of the cnange. An item 
whose price is established more closely in relation to 
the cost of labor and material in the item may be very 
sensitive to price changes in raw materials or vari-
ations in labor costs. '.i.'he questions of scarcity of 
supply, overproduction, obsolescence of style o"r use, 
or perishability are all i mportant influences on price 
change. Legislation governing minimum prices is but 
one of the elements that affect price. The question 
of time and place of s ample checks may be decisive 
factors in price studies •••• 
" Unless a real effort is made (1 ) to segr egate that 
part of t he consumer's dollar which is s pent for re-
tail goods, and (2) to determine what part of the re-
tail sales volume is under price contracts, excluding 
the unidentified brands as well as the great amount 
of goods branded but not price-controlled, no re ason-
able answer can be given to the question ' Have .!!'air 
'l'rade laws increased the cost of living? ' J.Vloreover, 
surveys on this question cannot be accepted as 
authentic until the surveyors are willing to look 
for the present unfavorable a s well as favorable re-
sults as they may affect their own personal interests. "23 
With the warning that the data is inadequate, unreliable, 
and i nconclusive, t he results of some of the surveys of 
price change since the enactment of Fair Trade Laws will be 
presented. 
1. Fair Trade and Lower Prices--Studie'S conducted by 
State Fair Trade Committees ope r ating under the leadership of 
the National Association of Retail Druggists have con-
sistently shown that prices have decreased since the passage 
24 
of ]'air 'l'rade Laws. For example, a Fair Trade Committee in 
23 
May, 1938. 
24 
Ibid., p . 5. 
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New York in reporting to a state convention announced that a 
reduction of 3.4% was possible for consumers since Fair 'l'rade 
Laws had been adopted. This conclusion was based on a sur-
25 
vey of 254 stores. 
In 1936 a survey was conducted in California and the 
results published. in 1938. 'The California State Pharmaceuti-
cal Association sampled 114 stores and 32 "well-known" 
i t ems. The results indicated that consumers could save 
6. ?.% when purchasing after the enactment of l!"'air Trade Legis-
lation as compared with purchases made before such laws had 
26 
been in force in that state. At least two criticisms are 
possible of this investigation. First, the sample is ob-
viously extremely small, and hence even though not pur-
posely selected so as to reveal the desired results, the 
conclusions must be used with caution. But the second fault 
lies in the failure of the report to state definitely that 
the 32 items examined were items which were under resale 
price maintenance contracts. As reported by the Journal, 
these commodities represent 32 "well-known" items, but 
clearly if they were not all subject to price control the 
validity of the results is destroyed. 
Results of surveys conducted in various states and 
covering in each case from 60 to 65 items "all well-known 
25 
N. A. R. D. Journal, p. 12, J an. 5, 1939. 
26 
~·, p. 18. 
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and continually in demand" reveal that on the whole consumers 
have enjoyed savings of from 1. 55~b to 6. 7% on their general 
27 
drug :ourchases since the passage of Fair 'Trade Laws . rl'he 
statistics produced by some of these surveys yielded the 
28 
follo wing data: 
The Fair Trade Committee of the Pennsylvania Phar-
maceutical Association investigated stores in all areas and 
from the 764 stores which reported information it was 
learned tha t 36% of the items listed were lower than during 
the pre-Fair Trade era; 11~ of the items were higher; the 
total consumer saving in Pennsylvania was 2. 6;0 . 
I n the Florida survey consu..rners saved 2.8·3b ; 32% of the 
items listed were reduce d ; 10% were raised. 
From a study of 231 drug stores the Kentucky Phar-
maceutical Association found a s aving to the public of 2.8·j& 
sine e the adoption of Fair 'l'rade Laws. 
Massachusetts consumers benefited to the extent of 
4% according to a survey of 758 stores made by the Massa-
chusetts Fair Trade Committee. 
Reports from 694 stores in i,Visconsin indic ated a s eving 
to consumers of 2. 7~~ . 
The Journal emphasizes tha t none of the surveys have 
shown a general increase in coststo consumers since the ad.-
27 
Ibid., p. 19. 
28-
rrhe following data is all from the N . A. R. D . Journal, 
Jan. 5, 1939. 
-130-
vent of Fair Trade 11When prices are figured over a group of 
items " . Reduction on some items offset increases on formerly 
footballed leaders. 
Again there is justifiable criticism of the size of the 
samples. ~ut even more important is the criticism that it 
is not evident from the results as reported that the sur-
veys covered only price-maintained articles. In fact, there 
is some evidence to lend support to the belief that the sur-
veys ·were made to cover both price-maintained and non-price-
maintained goods. I f the commodities subject to price main-
tenance are not isolated, what validity can there be to the 
conclusion tha t prices in general have been lowered ~ a ~­
sult of l''air 'l'rade ~? Offsetting lowered prices on non-
price-maintained Inerchandise can not fairly be included in 
such a study. Not only is it not evident that such items 
were lower as a result of l!'air Trade, but judicious selection 
of items and careful timing could obviously nroduce any re-
sults desired. The natural susp icion connected with any 
statistical data gathered by an interested pressure group is 
further ground for discounting these results. 
l.n May 1938 the Drug 'l'rade Credit Exchange of Chicago 
received reports from 400 I llinois drug stores in answer 
to price questionaires. 'l'he results revealed the more mo-
dest conclusion that prices were balanced, increases being 
29 
offset by decreases. However, in March 1936 Sales 
29 
Ibid • , p . 18 . 
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Management stated that the results of a survey made by an in-
dependent agency which investigated 450 drug stores in 6 
30 
states revealed that 11 prices 'IJ\Iere not greatly increased. rr 
According to the Journal, drug trade organ, druggists 
are not asking exhorbi tant profits on i terns sold under ] 'air 
'l'rade stipulations. F'ew national leaders are sold at full 
list retail prices, and most of that class of product, while 
not sold at .!!'air Trade minimums, are offered to the public 
at some reduction form advertised retail prices. 'l'hi s, con-
eludes the J ournal, indicates that druggists are willing to 
go a long way with consumers on prices. On the whole, it 
reports, druggists are jubuliant over the results of .!.! 'air 
Trade which means that independents can now compete on an 
equal basis with the big outlets. These laws have meant an 
31 
increased volume of drug business for the independents. 
I ndeed on the surface it is difficult to understand how 
Fair Trade Laws could possibly effect lowered prices. It 
might possibly be argued tha t as a result of severe predatory 
price cutting wide distribution had been curtailed with con-
sequently decreased production of some of the leaders. Such 
a situation theoretically might have raised costs of pro-
duction so that consumer prices were necessarily forced to 
rise. The advent of .!!'air 'l'rade, by restoring the wide dis-
30 
I bid. 
31-
I bid., p. 20. 
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tribution held essential to lower prices, mi ght therefore be 
credited with actually reducing the general price level. 
tlowever, such circuitous reason ing is theoretical in the 
extreme, and i mpossible of proof. 
lt should also be pointed out that price maintenance 
applies to trade-marked goods which have in practice been 
used flagrantly as loss leaders by chains and de:pantment 
stores. Any survey , therefore, unles s it i ncludes price 
s a~ples from these outlets, is invalid. A survey made only 
of independent stores mi ght well show a decrease in prides, 
s ince these stores had not used loss lea der sell ing to any 
grea t extent and hence a slight reduction might have been 
instituted after ~the advent of Fair Trade. But if the sur-
vey included price changes on the loss leader items of the 
big outlets t he results obvi ously would be different. 
J ne other possibility for reduced prices as a result 
of ll'air 'l'rade Laws might occur in the affect these laws would. 
have on the selling policy of the larger stores. I f before 
the :B·air Trade era they customarily sold leader items at a 
los s and rec oupted these los ses by disguised but exhorbitant 
prices on non-identifiable merchandise, t hey might now be 
able to abandon high prices on the unlabelled goods since the 
eliminati on of losses on leader items no longer made it 
nece ssary to compensate gains i n other denartments and on 
other i terns. .t-wwever, no data is available t o support such 
a theory. 
2. :B 'air 'l'rade and Higher Prices--In the preceding section 
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it was seen that many surveys by groups interested in the 
success of :Fair Trade Laws indicated that as a result of 
these laws p~ices had in general tended to be lower. A re-
port by an independent agency, however, stated that its i n-
vestigation revealed that prices were not greatly inc r eased. 
but when attention is given to the results reported by the 
r ab i dly anti-Fair Trade groups, of which the most out-
standing exponent is Macy's, it is seen tha t prices have 
gre a tly increased ~ ~ result of Fair 1'rade Legislation. 
I n its analysis of the incr ease i n consumer costs di-
rectly traceable to price fi x ing , I'Jiacy reported in September, 
1 93?, that price maintenance i s confined to comparatively 
fe'\'1' manufacturers i n cosmetic s , drugs, liquor, and pub-
lishing. Even with an a dded 74 items to the price-main-
tained gr oup, 99% of the articles on sale a t Macy ts were 
still price f ree, whether national or private brru1ds. Ob-
viously l.l}lac y is giving specific attenti on to the articles 
tha t were price-maintained. 
By oepternber 30, 193?, they claim that 56? patent med-
i cene s in their store cost 15.6% more than before the advent 
of re s ale price mainten ance l aws. !:Hmilarly , liquors, were 
raised 12 .1% on 1?3 different items, and ?34 books were 
32 
1?.7% higher. 
32 
business ~eek , Oct. 6, 1937. 
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~:he ~ York .tierald- 'l'ribune one June 9, 193?, carried 
a l a rge t'lacy advertisement under the slogan "Price Fixing 
rt eans Ilrice Raising 11 • This advertisement stated that 149? 
branded items in Macy's had been price-fixed by manufacturers. 
h owever, these 149? items were a part of a total stock of 
over 300,000 items. I nteresting also is the statement that 
only 44 items other than drugs, liquor, books and cosmetics 
33 
were subject to price maintenance. 
The advertisement t hen procedes to present statistical 
data on the percentage increase in branded items subject to 
price control. They exhort the consumer to be sure to ask 
which items are price-fixed, and to insist 6n Macy's own 
private brands which are always priced lower than the nation-
ally advertised , price-maintained commodities. Their sta-
tistics show the number of price-fixed items in each classi-
fica tion together with the percentage increase in prices since 
the passage of the Feld-Crawford Act: 
Items 
Cosmetics 
Drugs 
Books 
Liquor 
Miscellaneous 
912 
36? 
3 7 
13? 
44 
34 
%Increase 
8 .1~~ 
16.6% 
24.4% 
14.6% 
21.5% 
Such an advertisement not only shows an increase in the 
price of nationally branded merchandise which is subjected 
33 
Harvard Business School, QE. Cit., exhibit 6. 
34 
Ibid. 
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to price-maintenance, but is further evidence of the way in 
which the opponents of Fair 'rrade have turned these laws into 
an effective advertising device to serve their o~m interests 
by aiding them in the sale of private brands. Instead of 
using loss leaders, propaganda and direct price comparisons 
are used to stimulate sales of their own brands. 
It is of course obvious that prices are bound to reveal 
a rise when studies are made in only those stores that had 
used these very items as l oss leaders for advertising :pur-
poses. No other result could have been expected. The real 
question is whether consumers in the long run are better off 
under preQatory price-cutting and loss leader selling or 
whether they are ultimately benefited by the elimination of 
such t a ctics which prevents their being made victims of false 
price comparisons, and which permits the continuance of the 
independent dealer. That is a question to which arguments 
both pro and con have been presented in an e arlier chapter. 
An experience tha t is at least thought-provoking in re-
gard to the position of the consumer under li'air rrr a de Laws 
was cited by Hicky Brothers Co., of Ventura, California, who 
discuss the price situation in the sale of Pyrex, which is 
no,i'l under a price maintenance agreement. Before price con-
t racts were made, a large depa rtment store consistently cut 
price s below the list price of Pyrex, and independent mer-
chants, to keen sales volume, h ad to meet this price des~ ite 
t heir smaller volume and buying power. This meant that most 
of the profit was remo ved from sales of this commodity. After 
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this product was placed under price control, the depart-
ment store was forced to raise its price; the independent 
store received its full margin; and neither store suffered 
a loss in sales volume. Both the independents and the de-
partment store enjoyed the benefits of the increased mar-
35 
gin. 
I t is difficult to see just how sales volume was main-
tained in the face of raised prices unless the commodity were 
inelastic in respect to demand. If the demand were in-
elastic, and the margin had been increased, the department 
store apparently is getting an undue profit, and the con-
sumer is apparently bearing the burden through increased 
costs. 
Although surveys conducted b y many State Fair Trade 
Committees and State Trade Associations indicated a general 
lowering of the nrice level as a result of :B'air Trade, the 
limitations both statistical and prejudicial seriously af-
fects their reliability. When it is remembered with what 
tenacity the retail interests have exerted pressure in die-
tating the terms of the resale price maintenance contracts 
exacted from often unwilling manufacturers, the results of 
surveys by such associ ations are subject to further dis-
count. On the other hand, the price claims by opposing in-
terests such as Nacy's are also to be used with care to avoi d 
fallacious conclusions. 
35 
Hardware Retailer, Dec., 1937. 
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unfortunately, no definite conclusions on the influence 
of Fair ·.rrade Laws on prices is po ssible . The student is 
left to temper with his personal judgment the results as 
presented from both sides in the d is~ute. ~he only basis 
for a conclus ion lies in correl ating the i nadequate price 
results with other facts, such as the distributor pressure 
used in exacting price maintenance contracts. ~uch a con-
clusion, however, would result in theoretical re a soning, 
and would not be a result of objective statistical data. 
Until some unb i a sed agency performs an independent statis-
tical survey based on adequate samples, all conclus ions must 
be postponed. 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSI ::JN 
V. CONCLUSION 
~ven with the passage of laws specifically lega lizing 
the practice of resale price maintenance under which many 
manufacturers have executed price maintenance contracts, it 
is i mpossible to present any definite conclusions on the 
economic effects of this merchandising device. 'l'he absence 
of reliable statistics precludes the formation of objective 
op i n ions on this pr oble:r.1 . What has been attempted, there-
fore, has been the presentation of the arguments both eco-
nomic and legal on both sides of the question, to point out 
poss ible sources of strength and weakness in these arguments, 
and to indicate suggestive trends as evidenced from certain 
conditions prevalent under t he Fair Trade Laws. Unfortu-
nately, no more definite commitments are possible on this 
highly controversial que s tion. 
The economic arguments in favor of Fair Trade legislation 
have centered about the competitive factor in the theory of 
orthodox economy ; likewise the opposing arguments have also 
revolved about t h is feature. Both interests have stoutly 
mainta ined an i mplicit faith in an economy in which prices 
and production are regulated .by competition. The disagree-
ment has occurred as to the means of preserving that type 
of economy. .Lt has been a cardinal principal of laissez 
faire economics that the national economy should be devoid 
of either private or poli tical forces which tend to destroy 
the effectiveness of competition as a regulator. 
The practice of resale price maintenance has been con-
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demned as an instrument which interferes with the clear 
functioning of competition. lt has been cha rged that this 
practice by which a manufacturer controls the price at which 
his product is resold by retail outlets really serves to 
promote inefficiency, protects the we ak concerns, and in-
hibits the competitive check by which the public is sup-
posedly benefited through resultantly lower p rices. jjy fos-
tering uneconomic businesses and permitting a manufacturer 
to set whatever price he sees fit, this scheme tends to be 
essentially monopolistic, a condition obviously in conflict 
with that of free competition. The courts until recent date 
have supported this view, and the :B'ederal 'l'rade Commission 
has consistently condemned resale price maintenance as an un-
fair method of competition--as a practice which destroys the 
regulative effectiveness of competition. 
Curiously, the proponents of resale price maintenance 
have maintained that this practice in reality promotes com-
petition, preserves the automatic economy. Under a condition 
of predatory price cutting the way is supposedly paved for 
the devel opment of monopoly. Compet i tion , when unbridled, 
becomes it s o~~ enemy. Therefore, they have argued, it is 
es sential to the preservation of t he competitive system that 
business be allowed t o take steps to eliminate these unde-
sirable products of an uncontrolled competition. ~ fhen com-
petition in the utility field proved unsound, goverrLment 
regulation became necessary. ~imilarly, they have contended, 
when the evils of competition in retail trade become 
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threatening, action is necessary to curb the danger. 
So strongly did the forces favoring the legalization of 
resale price maintenance present their arguments that by 
1938 the private right of a manufacturer to contract for the 
resale price of his commodity was legalized in 43 states and 
recognized by the Federal government as a combination free 
from prosecution under the Sherman Anti- 'l'rust Act. The 
real conclusion needed, therefore, is whether these laws 
have removed competition as a regulator of our economy, and 
wh e ther the results of this legislation have been economi-
c ally sound. 
In the first chapter, the effort was made to pre sent the 
e conomic arguments for and against resale price maintenance. 
I n the f ourth chapter the attempt was made to indicate the 
sta tus of competition under the ne~" l aws which finally per-
mitted price maintenance. 'l'here is no need to repe at those 
a r guments here. But one additional point might well be 
offered. 
Frequent mention was made of the fact that it was sig-
nificent that most of the resa le price maintenance contracts 
adopted under the ll'air Trade Laws have involved four types 
of merchandise--books, liquor, cosmetics, and drug s. The 
greatest demand for .!!'air 'l'rade Legislation came from these 
interests, and it was on these goo ds that price c~tting was 
most severe. This is the type of merchan dise that has de-
veloped identification so strongly in the co nslli~er's mind 
that it forms an ideal loss leader. Whether or not 
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destructive price cutting on these items actually infl icted 
in j ury on the pr oducer is que s t i onable. That inde-pendent 
stores of a s pecialty nature were a dversely affected seems 
undeniable. Possibly the exi s tence of small specialty 
dealers is uneconomic. .i£ven assuming that such is the case, 
and recognizing tha t J:i'a ir Tr ade Laws have been enacted 
mainly at the instigation of s pecial i nterests for t heir own 
purposes, there still remains one mitigating factor. 1'he se 
four prominently price-maintained articles are all luxury 
or semi-luxury items and consume but a fraction of the pur-
chasers' dollars. I f Fair Trade has favored special in-
terests, it has perhaps done so at but little detriment to 
the consumer. I n the more staple lines re sale price main-
tenance is conspicuously insignificant. 'l'herefore, whether 
or not economically justified, Yair Trade Laws perhaps even 
at their worst may not be seriously harmful. Also when it 
is recalled that these laws are all permissive, not man-
datory, their possible thre at to an efficient economy is still 
further reduced. 
Against thi s , however, it should be stressed once more 
t h at while ostensibly permiss ive, these laws have actually 
been converted into mandatory legislation in some instances 
by the introduction of dealer; press ure upon manufacturers. 
Obviously when used in this way the true intent of the laws 
to prevent horizontal price fixing is destroyed. 'l'his how-
ever is perhaps less a legal defect than an a dministrative 
problem. It does, however, throw a questionable light on these 
l aws and empha sizes the difficulties of artifi ci a l attemnts 
to regulate an economy. 
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I n view of the lack of real information on the true ef-
fects of resale price maintenance legislation, it might be 
helpful to present the conclusion reached by a government 
economist who ends an excellent article on "The Present 
Status of Fair 'l'rade Laws" with these words: 
"Fair Trade legisla tion has been achieved through the 
persistent efforts of a relatively few business men 
who h ave f ought uhtiringly for this cause for a number 
of ye ars. Many businessmen are either strongly for 
or strongly against the legislation. A great many 
accept Fair Trade without much concern . one way or the 
ot her; and it i s doubtful if the consumers are gen-
erally conscious of the i nfluence or meaning of such 
legislation ex cep t in isolc:. ted ins tances. 
"Those who want ] 'air 'Trade laws have t hem and secure 
certain benefits from them. In this classification 
comes a large numb er of small independent distri-
butors and a relat i vely few manufacturers. 
"There are, however, good economic and practical 
arguments against Fair Trade laws; but opponents of 
Fair Trade laws have several means of avoiding t heir 
re strictions--notably by promoting and expanding 
the sale of private brands and by the expl6itat ion 
of commodities and services not coming wi t hin the 
jurisdiction of Ji'air Tr a de laws. The law means much 
to those manufacturers and distributors who want it 
and should mean rela tively li.ttle to tho s e who do 
not want it. rrhe success of the movement and the 
expansion of its coverage i nto a larger number of 
indus tries i s dependent upon the manufactur ers' i n-
terpretation of constw1er response to the legi s lation. 
\~nen manufacturers cease to find it profit able, it 
will be not longer function . At the pre s ent time 
price contracts cover a negligible part of the con-
sumer's s pendable i ncome; and even with a mar ked 
expansion of industry coverage, it is not likely ever 
t o cover a l ar ge shar e of cons~er exnen ditures 
going into the cost of living . " 
l 
N'elson r~Iiller, Survey of Current .business, May, 1938. 
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